Modeling video art. Bergsonian approach by Barvinska, Valeriia
University of Tartu 
Department of Semiotics 
Valeriia Barvinska
MODELING VIDEO ART. 
BERGSONIAN APPROACH
Master Thesis
Supervisor: Katre Pärn
Tartu
 2015
I have written the Master Thesis myself, independently. All of the other authors’ texts, main 
viewpoints and all data from other resources have been referred to. 
Author: Valeriia Barvinska ....................................................... 
(signature) ....................................................................... (date) 
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................5
1.1. Problem Overview ..........................................................................................................5
1.2. Further Terminological Clarification ............................................................................11
1.3. Metaphorical Modeling ................................................................................................ 13
1.4. Overview of Chapters....................................................................................................16
2. Introduction into Early Video Art......................................................................................... 19
2.1. The Ambiguity of a Phenomenon..................................................................................19
2.2. Historiographical Overview.......................................................................................... 21
2.3. Diversity of Definitions for Video Art...........................................................................23
2.4. Relevant Characteristics of Video Art........................................................................... 25
2.5. Image Technicians: Choice of Artists............................................................................30
3. Sketching the Model of Memory ......................................................................................... 34
3.1. Structural Parts of Bergson's Theory of Memory..........................................................34
3.2. Memory as Duration .....................................................................................................39
3.3. Memory as Affective Force .......................................................................................... 42
4. Modeling Video Art as Memory........................................................................................... 47
4.1. The Mind and the Camera............................................................................................. 47
4.2. Non-Representational Medium..................................................................................... 52
4.3. Materialisation of Video as Actualisation of Memory..................................................56
4.4. Duration as Temporality and Modulation of Video.......................................................61
4.5. Reflexivity and Indexicality of Video Art..................................................................... 66
4.6. Altering Perception: Synthesis and Processing............................................................. 72
4.7. Body and Real-Time Video........................................................................................... 79
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 86
References.................................................................................................................................90
Eestikeelne kokkuvõte.............................................................................................................. 95
Appendices................................................................................................................................97
ill. 1: Nam June Paik “9/23/69: Experiment with David Atwood”......................................97
ill. 2: Steina Vasulka “Distant Activities”.............................................................................97
ill. 3: Dan Sandin “Triangle in Front of Square in Front of Circle in Front of Triangle”....98
Ill. 4: Stephen Beck and Warner Jepson “Illuminated Music”............................................. 98
ill. 5: Steina Vasulka “Violin Power”................................................................................... 98
ill. 6: Woody Vasulka “The Matter”..................................................................................... 99
ill. 7: Steina Vasulka “Orbital Obsessions”.......................................................................... 99
ill. 8: Eric Siegel “Einstein”................................................................................................. 99
ill. 9: Peter Campus “Three Transitions”............................................................................100
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Overview 
Memory and video are two different phenomena. On one hand, it seems they have almost
nothing in common: the former initially belongs to the domain of living beings, and the latter
is originally the technological offspring. On the other hand, if forcefully combined together,
memory and video could result in all sorts of artificial composites – from video memory as a
computer memory that stores buffered video, memory of video as a form of human memory
remediated by video to  social  and personal  memories  in  the  broader  contexts  of  storage,
exchange and copying. 
Yet this is not the connection I am eager to find with this research. In my work, I seek
to draw the metaphorical analogy between a very particular concept of memory and a very
specific form of video. Rather than attempting to find a firm and steady correlation, I intend to
go  into  the  depth  of  the  structural  and  functional  components  of  these  two  notions  and
propose the possible model of memory that could be applied to video as an art form, and
otherwise.  Narrowing down the notions of memory and video, I draw the particular analogy
between the concept of memory coined by Henri Bergson on one hand, and early video art as
an independent art form that flourished in the 1960s and faded in the late 1980s with the
proliferation of digital technologies, on the other.
Both phenomena – memory in Bergson and video art – pose a number of challenges to
scholars and researches. Not only do these two notions seem peculiar in the relevant contexts
of memory studies and art, but they also disrupt the conventions of the frameworks they are
put  in.  Thus,  Bergson's  explanation  of  memory  radically  differs  from  other  concepts  of
memory  existing  in  cognitive  science  and semiotics. It  offers  an  unusual  perspective  for
thinking of memory independently through its unique modality of being and conceives the
process of recollection in reverse order – by moving from the past into the present. In addition
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to this, Bergson highlights that memory is not stored in the brain but exists in the form of
duration, and unfolds in time through the prolongation of the past into the present. In this
process,  the  recollection  starts  on  periphery  –  outside  the  living  body  –  then  gradually
descents  towards  the  body  and  ends  with  perception. For  this  reason,  the  concept  of
perception  plays  an  important  role  in  the  theory  of  Bergson  and  lays  the  ground  for
actualisation of memory in the present moment. Furthermore, memory in Bergson surpasses
the  notions  of  representation  implying  that  the  latter  does  not  articulate  the  sensible
knowledge of the animated world but, in contrast, averts the comprehension of life by offering
a symbolic replacement to it. 
Analog video as an artistic medium, in turn, holds the ambivalent position between
technology and art, and for this reason, cannot be comprehended separately from one of these
two phenomena. Such an 'in-betweenness' endows video art with a kind of peculiar status: on
one hand, the technological features of the video medium are directly influenced by other
closely  related  and heavily  institutionalised technologies  – television and cinema.  On the
other,  because  of  the  relative  freedom  inherent  in  art,  video  art  escapes  technological
institutionalisation and affects emotionally, like most of the artworks1. Moreover, due to the
signaletic nature of video as an art medium, it develops its own modality of being that is
characterised by the omnipresence of video signal, its plasticity, immediacy and high degree
of interactivity. When all these signaletic features are multiplied by artistic expressivity, video
art, I argue, avoids representation inasmuch as memory in the theory of Bergson. In fact, the
non-representational character of analog video was highlighted by many video artists who
stressed  that  the  former,  if  embodied  in  the  artistic  medium,  exists  on  its  own  thereby
manifesting a dynamic energy of life. 
Not only are video art and memory in the theory of Bergson ambiguous and open to
doubt, but they also escape any precise definition. Thus, Bergson defines memory as an active
'intelligent' recognition as opposed to the automatic recognition of our body, or claims that
memory is an interface between the virtual and the actual. After that he further stresses that
memory is, in fact, consciousness, and then calls it duration and plunges into discussion of the
multiplicity of durations.  Moreover,  Bergson develops the idea of the existence of several
types of memory which intermingle with each other, and in some cases, even stand for each
1 Apart from, probably, conceptual art
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other. 
Taking into account all these difficulties, in this work, I use Bergson's definition of
memory as a virtual potential of the past that unfolds in time through the prolongation of the
past into the present (Bergson 1911). It is characterised by both intelligent recognition and
affective ability to discern particular images of the past from the universe. In addition, it has
the potentiality to transform itself, and uses this self-transformation in order to accomplish
itself in the embodied perception on one hand, and to bring the past into the present, on the
other.  Bodies,  in  this  respect,  are  considered  as  the  centre  of  action  and  the  'theatre  of
memory'. 
Video art as a young field, in addition to its close entanglement with technology, also
encompasses an extensive variety of artistic practices, sub-genres,  and visual experiments,
significantly overlaps with other forms of artistic expression such as experimental cinema,
installations, performance art, body and land art, and even embodies in itself two different
media – the analog and the digital. For this reason, any attempt to find a precise definition for
video art turns into a fairly complicated enterprise. In this work, I loosely define video art by
excluding  all  other  art  forms  that  might  overlap  with  the  video  medium  in  art.  More
specifically,  I  neither include such closely related sub-genres as experimental filmmaking,
performance  and  installation  arts,  nor  I  incorporate  videos  made  for  the  purpose  of
documentation and preservation of other artworks. Instead, under the term of video art I refer
to the scope of the experiments done by video artists since the appearance of the medium in
the 1960s in order to explore the unique innovative characteristics of video. 
Furthermore, I limit myself by the time-frame of early video art which is set between
the 1960-1980s. It is done in order to bound the object of my analysis on one hand, and to
inquire into the germinal form of analog video in more detail, on the other. Such a delimited
focus, I think, can additionally shed light on the ontology of digital video as a direct successor
of analog video, and what is more important, can lay the ground for better understanding of
currently evolving hybrid media which entangle both the digital and the analog. 
From this perspective,  Bergson's concept  of memory and video art  share common
features which, I think, create the premise for making possible the construction of the model
of memory as video art and vice versa. The initial assumption of the existence of points of
connection between memory in Bergson and video art  is made based on writings of such
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video  artists  as  Bill  Viola,  Steina  and  Woody Vasulka,  Gene Youngblood,  Ira  Schneider,
Stephen Beck,  Nam June Paik and Angela Melitopoulos among others. In their works, the
technological medium of video stood for the first time as an art medium in its own rights and
was  endowed  with  the  capacity  for  physical  action.  By  juxtaposing  video  art  with  film
technology, these artists assigned to the former the specific quality of being able to trace light
in its constant movement, expose the continuity of time, and finally, to express a kind of
ontological 'liveness' inherent in video as an artistic medium. 
Thus, writing about the specific features of video, Bill Viola compares the medium to
Nikola Tesla's radio calling video a “transmission of intelligence”2 (Viola 2003 [1982]: 465)
and appreciates a unique vitality of the electronic medium. In turn, Nam June Paik proclaims
that video is time:
What Godard says about cinema ('truth 24 times a second') does not hold in video. Because in video,
there is no space (delimited frame) there is only time (lines without thickness).To produce color in
video one has to translate color in time. Colors in video are millionths of seconds. Video is essentially
time (Paik 1981 quoted in Ross 2006: 83).
Steina and Woody Vasulka call the artistic medium of video a shapeable clay and see in video
art the possibility to expand the habitual way of looking and go beyond “the idiosyncrasies of
human vision” (Steina Vasulka in Haller 1981 [1980]: 3). In addition, unfolding the argument
that video is primarily time technology,  Angela Melitopoulos proposes that the former can
stand  for  a  new  system  meant  to  synthesize  duration  and  intensities.  According  to
Melitopoulos,  video  forms  intervals  in  the  same  way  as  memory  does  in  the  theory  of
Bergson, and thus, eventually brings “the past into the present, letting “the dead” appear in
“the living” (Melitopoulos 2003). Eventually, the expressions of these and other artists with
regard  to  video  have  sketched  the  directions  to  follow  in  my  initial  assumption  and
additionally encouraged to excavate more possible analogies between memory and video art. 
In turn, a more detailed inquiry into the hypothetical connection between video art and
Bergsonian theory has brought me to a few academic attempts to combine Bergson's ideas and
video. Thus, a philosophical and observant approach is provided by an Italian sociologist and
philosopher  Maurizio  Lazzarato.  In  his  book  Videophilosophie:  Zeitwahrnehmung  im
2 However, it is worth to mention that for Viola, the same is true for digital video and digital video processing: 
“Digital computer and software are holistic; they think in terms of whole structures. [...] Data space is fluid 
and temporal, hardcopy is for real – an object is born and becomes fixed as “transmission of intelligence”  in 
time.” (Viola 2003 [1982]: 465) In turn, Viola's conclusion gives food for thought in approaching the 
difference between analog and digital video. 
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Postfordismus, he draws on Bergson and constructs the argument that video technologies –
from analog to digital – compress and synthesize time eventually producing new forms of
subjectivity  (Lazzarato  2002).  Lazzarato,  however,  is  more  concerned  with  political
implications of this process, and because the latter lies beyond the scope of my research, can
support  my  argument  only  fragmentary.  Furthermore,  he  is  specifically  interested  in  the
temporalities of video as a technical medium, and this fact, in turn, also narrows down the
spectrum  of  possible  application  of  his  theory  in  my  paper.  Nevertheless,  Lazzarato's
assumptions about the role of video technology in the production of subjectivity and, what is
more important, his appealing adaptation of Bergson, give me food for thought showing that I
may be on the right track. 
Another  important  theoretician  who  has  indirectly  influenced  my  research  is  a
Norwegian  media  scholar  Ina  Blom.  For  Blom,  she  studies  video  art  from  the  archival
perspective and argues for video to be a driving force for new social typologies. According to
her, video art produces a new way of thinking that spins around a phenomenon of real time.
Not only is this technical feature of video perceived by human senses as immediate, even
though on the technological level, the delay between input and output exists nonetheless, but
it also links knowledge with action by means of a specific autonomy of technological agency
(Blom 2013).  At the same time, Blom sees the latter  aspect  rather  as a new possibly for
humanity  in  the  age  of  technology  than  human's  inadequacy  of  cognition  as  opposed to
machines. In this regard, she proposes to evaluate video as a form of agency – an independent
technical modality that introduces a new temporal dimension into social reflexivity. Blom's
approach, however, expands far beyond video technology and video art and advances in the
direction of storage, data in motion, and aims to reassert the preservation of knowledge in
general. 
Departing from artists' reflections about video as an artistic medium and the academic
writings of these two scholars, the intuitive connection between Bergson's concept of memory
and video art can be drawn on many different levels. For instance, with respect to video as an
art form, memory can be conceptualised by way of the inspection of the processes that take
place  inside  the  camera  and  on  the  screen,  or  expanded  outside  and  projected  on  the
relationship of artists (also possible, viewers) and video. When dissecting the functional parts
of video art  and memory in  the  theory of Bergson,  a  firm connection can be established
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between the structural components of these two: for instance, a camera stands for an analogy
of the mind, a screen signifies the body, and various artistic approaches represent a projection
of the different types of remembering. Alternatively, the link can also be drawn based on the
external premises, for instance, via the assumption that both memory and the video medium
are time-based phenomena. Thus, the effect of both depends on real–time perception, and
therefore they can equally be analysed via the concept of time or through the close study of
human perception.
Given this variety of subtle parallels between memory in Bergson's theory and video
art, in order to avoid confusion and narrow down the modeling I establish the analogy on the
fourfold level. First, I compare the mechanism of video camera to the functionality of the
mind described by Bergson and suggest that if used in art, the former does not merely copy
the operations of the mind but expands these operations thereby bringing the latter closer to
intuition. Second, I see the parallels between the stages of actualisation of memory and the
processes of materialisation of video and seek to establish the connection between these two
functional elements. Third, I discuss duration as memory and draw the connection between a
unified duration and the expressive energetic movement of light on one hand, and a particular
type of duration (which Bergson calls human or psychological duration) and the temporality
of video art, on the other. Finally, trying to enrich the process of modeling, I establish the
metaphorical  analogy  between  the  affectiveness  of  bodies  in  Bergson  and  creative
expressivity of video artists reflected the world with their cameras. 
In doing so, in my research, I work towards three main objectives. First and foremost,
I want to comprehend these two peculiar concepts – Bergsonian notion of memory and video
art. In my opinion, the thorough understanding could be achieved in combination – when one
phenomenon is  projected  on  the  other.  Second,  I  seek  to  sketch  the  mechanisms of  how
memory and video art work. Once again, it could be done by looking at the similarities and
dissimilarities  between  these  two  phenomena.  By  extension,  I  think,  such  an  analogical
connection could also help me to path the way towards the definition of video art  in the
broader context, and lay the ground for the understanding of what makes video an artistic
medium on one side, and also can help to elucidate the mechanism of memory conceptualised
by Bergson, on the other. Third, by drawing the connection between video art and memory in
Bergson,  I  expect  to  touch  upon  the  digital-analog  debates  and  sketch  the  possibility  of
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application of the model of memory that I construct based on the theory of Bergson to digital
video art.
In this attempt, however, I do not seek to re-invent the concepts of memory, nor do I
claim that the traditional views on memory established in psychology, neuroscience, history
and philosophy have lost their credibility. By the same token, I do not strive to write a history
of early video art or construct the universal model of video as an art medium. Instead, what I
want to do is to look at memory and artistic video from a different, I think, more experimental
angle on one hand, and to propose a kind of model that could shed more light on these two
phenomena,  on  the  other.  In  doing  so,  I  am more  concerned  with  the  questions  of  how
memory operates in its physical connection to the world,  and how artistic video works in
tandem  with  artists  than  how  memory  and  video  art  should  be  interpreted  in  different
contexts. It is only my hope that as an outcome of this work, a few scientists and artists could
see their research areas in a broader light than before, and discover new methodological tools
that can derive from metaphorical modeling. 
1.2. Further Terminological Clarification 
The preceding sub-chapter poses a number of questions closely related to the ways in which a
medium of video enters the domain of art, and how it can be related to technology. At this
stage, not only is it important to elucidate my point of view on art in general, but also to
specify how technology becomes a medium of artistic expression in particular. 
For art, my long-lasting and countless attempts to understand its nature have started
with the interpretation via  semiotics, continued further with the tension of art  and reality
through Adorno and Lotman,  and finally  have  been accomplished3 with  Deleuze  and his
conception of art as 'blocs of sensations' (Deleuze, Guattari 1994). In this regard, in defining
art, I departure from the idea that as a very unique phenomenon, art touches on the sensory
level  in the first place, thus avoiding rational interpretations and reasonable descriptions via
language.  Because  of  this,  in  my opinion,  all  attempts  to  fully  explain,  analyse  or  even
verbalise the phenomenon of art deprive the latter of its power to enrich the present and to
some extent bring changes into the world. By the same token, in this work, I offer to think of
3 More specifically, I see this as 'up-to-date' accomplishment, since my endeavour to understand what is art has 
not yet been fully completed. 
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video art as an affective phenomenon, mainly because, in my opinion, a video artwork can be
deciphered only at the level of individual senses, and a kind of unified interpretation, in most
cases, destroys the artistic component. 
This latter statement, in turn, compels me to define the notion of 'artistic component'
or something that makes a certain use of technology artistic. In this regard, in my opinion,
technology becomes a medium of artistic expression when it enters into a kind of reciprocal
interaction  with  an  artist  and  a  viewer.  Video  image  is  by  any  means  produced
technologically: first, it is created either with the help of a video camera or generated by way
of synthesis; second, in the act of display, it is either performed by the artist in real time by
way of various technological manipulations, or played back for the viewers. For the former, I
find the role of the artist essential in the process of making artistic videos. Simply put, the
artwork cannot come into being without its creator, but what is more, it becomes an artwork
only  in  virtue  of  a  kind  of  synthesis  between  the  artist  and  the  video  medium.  For  the
audience, I suggest, in video art, the participatory role of viewers can be conceptualised as a
part  of the artwork itself.  Such a line of thinking,  in  my opinion, can be explained by a
performative nature of video art that in turn is closely related to the phenomenon of real time.
For this reason, I think, the audience is potentially involved into the process of making art
video. Not only does it witness the moment of a creative exchange between video and the
artist, but it also is 'plugged' into this very moment.
Due to the delimited focus of my research, while approaching this kind of multilayered
interactivity  of  video art  in  connection  to  memory  in  the  theory  of  Bergson,  I  primarily
concentrate on the expressivity of the artist and the relation established between the latter and
the medium of video. In this discussion, however, I do not advance further with the analysis
of the participatory role of viewers. For all that, I want to stress, such an approach does not
mean  that  I  disregard  the  viewer's  component  claiming  it  to  be  irrelevant  for  video  art.
Instead, I consider it as a matter of choice which I have decided to make in order to not get
lost in the boundless discussion. By and large, art as an affective and sensible phenomenon
and an artist as an integral part of video art, play a role of a sonar that helps to detect the
direction of my research, on one hand, and better  understand the features of video art  in
connection to memory in Bergson's theory, on the other. 
Despite in my view, there cannot exist a clear demarcation between art and technology
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in video art, I also acknowledge that such an integrity creates a number of problems for both
scholars researching video art and artists using video in their practices. At the same time, I
suggest, to certain extent, it also signifies a more broad change in art that takes place today –
the coalescence of art, technology, and science. At this point, it is necessary to add that in the
following, I discuss the medium of video mainly in the context of art as a special material or
'conductor'  employed by an artist  to  create  a  video work.  Nevertheless in  order  to  avoid
possible confusions, in the very limited occasions when I refer to video as technology without
attaching any artistic value, it is identified as 'video technology' or 'the technology of video'.
In addition to this, all intermediate terminology which inevitably intervenes this research is
clarified accordingly in the body of this work. For now, I want to turn to the methodology and
elucidate  the  research  strategy that  I  apply  in  order  to  move towards  the  answers  to  the
questions posed in this paper. 
1.3. Metaphorical Modeling 
As a methodological toolkit for this research I use the technique of metaphorical modeling. 
This  form of  analysis,  I  believe,  helps  not  only  to  establish  but  also  sustain  a  coherent
connection between two disconnected concepts and, in turn, offers an alternative perspective
for apprehension of both of them. However, before discussing my methodology in detail, I
want to give a brief theoretical overview of modeling and explicate the general outcome of
metaphorical modeling. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  models  are  mediators  between  theories  and  the  world
(Morgan, Morrison 1999). In the complex process of apprehension, theories deal with the
world on its own terms seeking to tell us what the world (or something in the world) is, while
models stand for a metaphorical or analogous representation of this world (or something in
the world) attempting to show us what something is like. At the same time, metaphors and
analogies are fundamental for every scientific research (Harré 2004). 
There are various ways in which metaphorical thinking enters the domain of scientific
modeling. Inasmuch as different combination of models can be metaphorical, other models
can  generate  metaphorical  terminology  or,  what  is  more  common,  combine  these  two
together. In this process, model is considered to be metaphorical if it  transfers knowledge
from one domain to another (Bailer-Jones 2009). In many cases, such a transfer in turn creates
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metaphorical language needed for the model from one discipline to be functional within the
scope of another discipline. As a result of this process, the general terminology commonly
associated  with  one  scientific  domain,  for  instance,  memory in  cognitive  science,  can be
widely applicable within another domain, as in this example, memory in computer science.  
Another option for metaphorical modeling is to use the structure of one object and
apply it for modeling the structure of another object. However, this is not to assert that every
such a model necessarily suggests similarities in structure but rather it points at the existence
of an analogy between two different phenomena.  These analogies can be related to  some
complementary attributes, functional relations, or various processes that take place in different
spheres of knowledge. As  Bailer-Jones aptly concludes, the most observant metaphors are
those that can identify a valuable analogy between phenomena from two different domains
(Ibid.). 
From such a perspective, metaphorical modeling offers a vast range of benefits for my
research. First, this form of analysis, I believe, helps not only to establish but also sustain the
coherent  connection  between  memory  and  video  art  without  sinking  into  the  debates  on
interpretation of  video,  video storage,  screen-memory,  and other closely related  questions
which beset video as an art medium, as well as memory. Instead, the method of metaphorical
modeling strives to construct its own metaphorical representation (which, in fact, does not
claim to be either faithful or exact) by establishing specific connections between these two
notions. By bringing forth the concept of memory offered by Henri Bergson, I am to project
the latter on the medium of video in art and explore the existing analogical aspects between
memory and video art. In doing so, I attempt to analyse the phenomenon of video art from a
new perspective and uncover the functional mechanism of video as a powerful artistic tool. 
Second,  not  only  does  this  kind  of  analysis  clarify  my  research  position  more
competently,  but  it  also  helps  to  excavate  all  the  possible  outcomes  of  modeling.  Thus,
metaphorical modeling comforts the linkage between video art and memory as two distinct
concepts on one hand, and sheds new light on their previously unknown characteristics, on the
other.  More  specifically,  metaphorical  analogy  not  only  transposes  knowledge  from  the
domain  of  memory  in  Bergson to  the  domain  of  video art,  but  also  modifies  our  initial
understanding  of  memory  and  video  and  appeals  to  their  reevaluation.  From  such  a
perspective, it is also possible to discover some of the unusual features of these both notions
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and even conceive new hypothesises and fresh ideas under different light. In total therefore,
via the application of such a methodology, I expect to understand specific characteristic of
memory in the concept of Bergson and analog video as a unique artistic phenomenon, and by
combining these two concepts,  assume the  possibility  of  the intermediate  hybrid between
video art and memory. As a long-term outcome of this research, I also want to lay the ground
for the more detailed and deep study of perception and memory in arts on one hand, and
temporalities of analog video, on the other. 
Third, undoubtedly substantial benefit of metaphorical modeling is the flexibility of
this  analytic  approach.  Rather  then  ratifying  certain  factual  similarities  or  dissimilarities
between  memory  and  video,  metaphorical  modeling,  instead,  is  more  about  transferring
knowledge from one domain to another. Such a transferal in turn navigates the research into a
more productive pathway, and extends its possible outcome. Furthermore, the connections
discovered in the process of modeling help to expand the horizons of my research and project
the theory of Bergson onto different fields of study thus making it more accessible to people
and,  by  extension,  more  applicable.  Also,  via  this  application,  I  want  to  inspect  the
perspectives for using Bergson and Deleuze for the study of video art and, by the same token,
the  study  of  video  art  for  the  purposes  of  memory  study.  Eventually,  the  approach  of
metaphorical modeling helps me to assign to Bergson's and Deleuze's works a more concrete
position in my research preventing from the danger of losing my own aims in the discussion
of the ideas of this authors. 
Certainly, there exist disadvantages of modeling. One of the most obvious criticisms is
the reduction that is inevitably present in every model. By focusing on specific aspects of one
phenomenon or an object, models tell us what something is partially like and, for this reason,
tend to be partial descriptions only (Bailer-Jones 2009: 2). It is reasonable to say that models
do not  explain  the  nature  of  a  particular  phenomenon,  yet,  I  think,  they  aptly  show the
direction. The latter, as it was stated, is of practical importance to me in this research. Rather
than trying to create the all-encompassing model of memory that can splendidly be applied to
video art, I am eager to discover some of the new pathways for approaching these concepts
inventively via the combination of creativity, intuition and scientific thinking. Such a line of
analysis, I assume, could be valuable not only for open-minded scientists, but also for artists
who often think in different terms by concentrating more on the seemingly disassociated parts
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in order to further assemble them in the harmonious whole.
It is also reasonable to say that no model is correct. At the same time, models can
provide a number of immeasurably helpful ways of understanding the world. For a model to
represent a particular phenomenon, it does not need to develop a theory. Instead, it offers a
way to make sense of the phenomenon and interpret it from another, less conventional, point
of view. In this connection, metaphorical modeling is especially expansive: it comprises both
features of modeling and metaphorical thinking. The multi-dimensionality of the world on one
side, and our perceptual restrains, on the other, require a great deal of imagination from the
researcher  in  the  attempt  to  comprehend  the  complexity  of  the  world.  And metaphorical
models, by transferring knowledge from one domain to another, allow us to take the features
and characteristics  of one small  object  and extend them on another,  much larger  object.  
Undoubtedly,  in  this  process,  intuition  is  a  very  important  player.  The  additional
originality of Bergson's theory, in this regard, is that he does not deny intuition but, quite the
opposite, engages it in the scientific analysis. It takes intuition to discover theories and find
valuable analogies, and the idea that I develop in this paper is, above all, brought about by
intuition. For Bergson, intuition, however spontaneous, comes to light as a result of touching
and penetrating the reality of things rather than constructing it. At the same time, this is not to
suggest  that he denies the importance of the intellectual  efforts.  Instead, the intellect  and
intuition are the powerful tools in comprehending the world in its movement, spontaneity and
constant transformation:
Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in
the very  direction  of  life,  intellect  goes in  the inverse  direction,  and  thus finds itself  naturally  in
accordance with the movement of matter [...] intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itself
[...] we have to place ourselves in intuition in order to go from intuition to the intellect, for from the
intellect we shall never pass to intuition. (Bergson 1922: 281-3)
In this light, I argue, metaphorical modeling equally employes both the intellect and
intuition and, therefore, significantly contributes to the process of understanding of life and its
phenomena. This is why I find such a method both imaginative and analytically proficient, as
well as conducive for the researches of such kind. 
1.4. Overview of Chapters
After  the  short  introduction  of  the  research  areas  that  overlap  in  my  work,  and  the
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presentation of a methodology I employ, I want to provide a brief description of the upcoming
chapters.  Apart from the introduction, the paper encompasses five additional  parts, a final
conclusion, a list of illustrations and a list of references. 
The  chapter  that  follows  the  introduction  –  a  second  chapter  –  provides  relevant
information needed for the apprehension of the phenomenon of video art. More specifically,
in this part, I start from the short historiography of video art and further introduce a range of
the problems that encircle video art as a young artistic field. After that I briefly discuss the
distinctive properties of video in comparison with television and cinematography. Though the
features of video art are analysed in more detail in the following chapters, in my opinion, the
adequate understanding of the phenomenon of video art can prepare the reader for an inquiry
into relationship between video art and memory in the theory of Bergson. In the final part of
the second chapter, I provide an additional description of the artistic movement which is of
particular interest to me and elicit the reasons of such an interest. 
In  the  third  chapter,  I  turn  to  Bergson  in  order  to  introduce  the  reader  into  his
philosophical views. This part is entirely devoted to the theory of Bergson: it explains his way
of  thinking  about  memory  and  perception,  elaborates  on  the  ideas  of  ontological  and
conscious  memory  and  ontological  and  conscious  perception,  and  elucidates  the
interconnection between different types of memory and perception. The separate sub-chapters
are dedicated to such complicated yet closely related to my research concepts as duration and
the affectivity of memory. To conclude this part, I draw two models of memory that derive
from the theory of Bergson – cone and kaleidoscope – and describe how memory works. I
want to add that due to the complexity of Bergsonian theory this chapter may be sometimes
difficult to follow as it requires a deep and immersive reading. Despite this, I tried to make it
less challenging and clarify some of the most problematic aspects. 
The fourth chapter makes a transition again to video, but this time, video is analysed in
close connection with memory. At this stage, when the ground needed for my discussion is
laid,  I  proceed  with  more  detailed  and  specific  characteristic  of  the  video  medium  and
compare it to the previously elicited concept of memory. By drawing a number of analogies
between video art and memory, I first, concentrate on the concept of the mind in Bergsonian
theory and compare it  to  the work of  a  video camera.  Second,  I  consider the  process of
materialisation of video in the frame of actualisation of memory as it is explained by Bergson.
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Third, I turn to the concept of duration and analyse it in connection to video temporality and
modulation of video signal. Fourth, I bring the idea of non-representational features of video
and  memory  and  discuss  the  theories  of  video's  reflexivity  proceeding  further  with  the
problematic  notion  of  the  indexical  nature  of  analog  video.  At  this  stage,  I  additionally
analyse  the  difference  between  analog  and  digital  video  and  try  to  bring  forward  the
analog/digital debates with respect to Bergson's concept of memory. 
Apart from this, in the fourth chapter, I touch upon the capacities of video art to alter
human perception and reduce the habitual way of looking at video images. From the side of
video art, I analyse classic video feedback, the technologies of video processing and synthesis
as intriguing phenomena able to  expand our perception of 'reality' and soften the bounds of
habit.  In  addition,  I  make  the  assumption  that  video  art,  if  analysed  from  Bergsonian
perspective, can potentially lower the perceptual threshold, and inversely, can therefore create
more possibilities for memory to be actualised in the present. 
Finally,  in the last  part  of the fourth chapter,  I attempt to expand the modeling of
memory with respect to a video camera and project it on the body of an artist. More precisely,
I develop the the idea that the role of an artist is fundamental for the process of making artistic
videos. In doing so, I apply Bergsonian concept of affective force of memory to real-time
video art and elaborate on the implications that derive from such an analogy. In addition, I try
to understand the nature of  video art  with respect  to  the assumed expressive connection
between the artist and the medium of video. Apart from this, I elucidate the problematic locus
of memory trying to account into the question of where recollections can be preserved. 
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2. Introduction into Early Video Art
In  this  chapter,  I  am  to  provide  an  introduction  into  early  video  art,  explain  its  loose
chronological frames, give brief historiographical overview of the sources suitable for my
research and shed light on the particular features of video as an art form. In doing this, I
attempt to sketch the background for the emergence of video as a new medium and lay out a
range of the problems closely associated with video art. In addition, I discuss the distinctive
properties  of  video  in  connection  to  other  related  technologies  –  television  and
cinematography. Finally, I briefly describe major movements in video art with an emphasis on
so called 'video engineers' in order to proceed with the specific characteristic of the video
medium that will  be explicated in the Chapter 4. Altogether,  the strategic purpose of this
chapter is to lay the foundations for better understanding of the phenomenon of video art on
one hand, and to smooth the transition between memory and video that will be offered in the
following, on the other.
2.1. The Ambiguity of a Phenomenon
Within institutional art, the status of video art as an art form, as well as the position of video
as an independent art medium, is challenged until today. This is not to suggest, however, that
video  art  was  outcasted  or  segregated  from other,  more  acceptable  (and,  certainly,  more
profitable4) means of artistic expression as, for instance, painting, sculpture, and photography.
On the contrary, almost every Biennale, art fair or art festival includes video works as an
inseparable part of their programme. Moreover, a large number of articles, essays and books
have been written on the topic of video art, especially, on its history, and an impressive chunk
of video works from the 1970-1980s is preserved and occasionally exhibited in the museums
all  over the world. However,  despite  all  this,  the phenomenon of video art  remains to be
4 Art video is one of the least profitable art works. It can be explained, on one hand, by its immateriality and 
immediacy when video is performed in a real-time mode, and, on the other, by its fast deterioration (in 
analog), difficulties of analog broadcasting (analog tape can be played on the analog video player or 
projected on a monitor via a video tape analog recording system), hight accessibility to mass audience (in 
digital) and hight rates of reproducibility (in digital). 
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obscure, and this fact, in turn, determines the general attitude towards video in the art world. 
One  of  the  possible  reasons  for  such  an  ambiguity  is  the  drastic  technological
modifications of the medium that have taken place in the late 1980-1990s when analog video
was gradually supplanted by its more technically advanced and adaptable digital successor.
This  rapid  proliferation  of  video  'digitization'  empowered  many art  historians  and  media
theoreticians with the reasonable premise to proclaim the death of analog video art and the
rise of new digital media art. Indeed, from this perspective, the change from the analog to the
digital not only drastically alters the nature of video, but also heavily influences its aesthetics.
At the same time though, as I elaborate later, the debates between the analog and the digital
remain  open,  and  for  this  reason,  the  international  quest  of  video  artists  is  yet  to  be
accomplished. 
Another possible explanation of the ambiguity of video art as a genre of artists' activity
can be found in high diversity of approaches, topics video artists dealt with, and strategies of
the exploration of the medium. From this perspective, video art can be conceptualised as a
part of a larger branch of performance art, or embedded in the broader scope of installation
and, as it was already suggested, also lodged in contemporary media art. To some extent, even
partial liberation of cinematography and the appearance of such artistic genres as expanded
cinema, experimental cinema, avant-garde cinema, called the independent existence of video
art into question, because similarly to the latter, these new modes of cinematic expression
revolted against the institutionalization of cinema, sought to establish a unique visual culture
and thereby eventually blurred the borders between video and cinema as art forms5. 
Finally, video as technology is highly multifunctional. Similarly to television, cinema,
and even photography, depending on the broader context, video can serve in the manner of
entertainment, as an instrument of marketing, a vehicle of political campaign and propaganda,
or even more, it  can be used for the military purpose as a surveillance device 6. From this
perspective therefore, video art is merely a narrow and a very particular practice within the
5 Steven Shaviro, an American film critic and philosopher, offers the term 'post-cinematic' in order to 
characterise a new media regime and corresponding to it a new mode of production that was brought up by 
digital technologies (Shaviro 2010). Digital video art, for this reason, is considered in post-cinematic terms 
like digital cinema, commercial video and digitally created experimental cinematography. At the level of the 
medium, I am in the agreement with Shaviro, yet I find the term 'post-cinematic' not sufficient for thinking of 
the interplay between video artwork and video artist.
6 The whole scope of the various applications of video goes far beyond politics, military, marketing and 
entertainment. The medium of video is widely used in medicine, science, technology, communications, and 
therefore, covers a vast diversity of functions and operations. 
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extensive scope of all other possible applications of video technology. 
2.2. Historiographical Overview
Due to the heightened significance of new media, performativity, and digitisation, there exists
a large number of scientific publications that can generally be characterised by their diversity
of approaches and a wide scope of the objects of analysis. At the same time though, the range
of  international  publications  on video art  that  deal  with video as  an artistic  medium still
comprises a limited number of monographs and an extensive collection of articles written by
amateurs, technicians, artists and critics. Apart from this, a large chunk of the works is either
narrowly  dedicated  to  the  problematic  history  of  video art  or  devoted  to  the  analysis  of
particular movements into which video art was enveloped7. Such a predicament of video art
stems from the fact that its advancement was tightly intermingled with the changes in social,
political and cultural spheres that took place in the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, I
have already stressed that the evolution of the video medium remains to be largely informed
by the continuous technological expansion, and therefore, also touches upon the problematic
relationship of humanity and technology in general, and the relationship of art and technology
in particular. Due to all these aspects, the monographs on video art's history, which tend to be
rather  explicitly  political8,  or  descriptive  monographs  that  aim to  summarise  the  diverse
movements of video artists do not provide a solid background for my research. At the same
time,  in  my opinion,  they  can  beneficially  be  employed  to  illuminate  some of  the  open
questions that perplex video art and video as an artistic medium. When touching upon the
history of video art, in this paper, I rely on two monographs: Michael Rush Video Art (2007)
and Catherine Elwes Video Art, a Guided Tour (2005). Written in a colloquial manner, these
books offer the descriptive assessment of video art avoiding any kind of political statements
and experimental speculations. The latter, however, can be found in the emblematic articles
from the  'classics'  in  the  theory  of  video art:  David  Antin,  Lucinda  Furlong,  Kathy  Rae
Huffman, Bruce Kurtz,  Paul Ryan, Christine Ross, Martha Rosler and Marita Sturken among
others. When combined with the outlined monographs, these works constitute a chunk of rich
7 For instance, Fluxus, conceptual and performance art, visual music movement, feminist and queer art, kinetic 
and installation art, and other diverse movements partly associated with video art.
8 However, as it was eloquently summarised by Bill Viola, video “may be the only art form ever to have a 
history before it had a history” (Viola quoted in Sturken 1990: 102). 
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and thought-provoking material for my paper.
Among  the  monographs  on  video  as  an  art  medium,  the  most  important  for  my
research is the publication of Yvonne Spielmann Video. The Reflexive Medium (2010) that has
marked the significant  turn in the theory of video on one hand, and manifested video as
independent medium in the academy, on the other.  Spielmann's argument  is  based on the
uncertainty  of  representation  and  the  ambivalent  materiality  that  video  bears  due  to  its
capacity  at  once  to  present  matter  and  to  reflect  immateriality  of  electronic  signals.
Concentrating primarily  on  signaletic  features  of  video,  Spielmann analyses  a  number  of
specific  characteristics  of  video  which  I  have  found  especially  insightful  and  helpful  in
building my argument. 
In addition, a small range of the observant monographs and compilations attempted to
illuminate the complicated nature of video art were written and edited by video artists. Thus,
Gene  Youngblood  in  his  book  Expanded  Cinema (1970)  discusses  a  wide  spectrum  of
problems that beset video art from the specific characteristics of different forms of video and
experimental film to the idea of the emergence of a new expanded consciousness triggered by
video and film. Ira Schneider and  Beryl Korot have edited an emblematic compilation of
essays Video Art: An Anthology (1976) that comprises a large chunk of essays written by the
famous video artists and art critics. These two books, in turn, help to widen the horizon of this
paper and explore video art from a larger perspective. 
Finally, a more narrow branch in video art that is of particular interest to me – video
processing and video synthesis – is practically underrated mainly due to its overlapping with
programming, engineering and experimentation electronics. Today, such a connection of art,
technology and science would not create any problem for a researcher, because media and
electronic arts have evolved into a separate art field. At the same time, however, in the 60s
and 70s, technologically manipulated video art was met with caution, and these artists were
considered as the marginal experimentalists 'playing' with hardware and electronics. Hence
the lack of professional art publications which in most cases narrowed to the research done by
Lucinda Furlong, a video artist and critic who wrote a series of articles on image processing
as a separate genre of video art. Furlong's observant articles cover professional paths of such
artists as Gary Hill, Eric Siegel, Stephen Beck, Steve Rutt, Dan Sandin, Bill and Louise Etra,
Steina and Woody Vasulka, Ralph Hocking, Sherry Miller, Nam June Paik, the Experimental
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Television  Center  group,  and  others. In  addition  to  Furlong's  historical  analysis,  two  big
electronic  archives  –  the  Vasulka  Archive9 that  encompasses  27,000  pages  of  documents
relevant to the history of video and electronic  art and the  Radical Software Web Site10 that
consists of a wide range of historic issues of video magazine Radical Software – have helped
me to discern the specific features of image processing art.
2.3. Diversity of Definitions for Video Art
In total, above mentioned factors have eventually complicated the growth of video art into a
separate artistic brunch on one hand, and also determined the vagueness of the definition of
video as a medium of art, on the other. Among the large number of existing definitions for the
video art phenomenon, in my opinion, it is nevertheless possible to discern four main pivotal
points around which these definitions are centred. In most cases, scholars and artists either
concentrate  on the specificity of the video medium, or make an accent on the perceptual
features of video when it is used in art, or try to delimit the particular time-frames of video
art, or at last, highlight its functionality as an art form. 
Thus, focusing on medium specificity, Spielmann defines video art as a scope of the
diverse  movements  of  artists  experimented  with  video since  the  early  appearance  of  the
medium,  and  differentiates  the  latter  from  television  and  film  through  audiovisuality,
reflexivity and flexibility11 (Spielmann 2010). In Spielmann's opinion, video is a signaletic
9 The Vasulka Archive is an extensive database for researchers in the field of video and media art that consists 
of a large number of articles, essays, interviews, reviews, schematics, diagrams, illustrations, posters, concert 
programs, photographs, and correspondence on the relevant topics. According to the description, a large 
percentage of this material directly relates to the art and careers of Steina and Woody Vasulka, however, it 
additionally encompasses the works of over 200 artists and scholars. Some of the material has been taken 
from periodicals that are both in and out of print. The rest has been taken from the personal collection of the 
Vasulkas that began over thirty years ago. In addition to the Vasulkas, Peter Crown, David Dunn, Ralph 
Hocking, Sherry Miller, Phil Morton, Lynda Rodolitz, Jud Yalkut, and Gene Youngblood have donated 
archive material. http://www.vasulka.org/about_archive.html
10 The Radical Software Web Site is a joint project of the Daniel Langlois Foundation, Davidson Gigliotti and 
Ira Schneider. The project's aim is to document and preserve a wide range of scholarly and artistic works on 
video art and its history initially compiled as a part of a printed Radical Software magazine. Originally, the 
individual physical copies of Radical Software can rarely be found, yet the Radical Software Web Site makes 
the content of the digital copies freely available and searchable on the Internet. 
http://www.radicalsoftware.org/e/index.html 
Currently, both projects – the Vasulka Archive and the Radical Software Web Site – are the part of the Daniel 
Langlois Foundation (http://www.fondation-langlois.org/html/e/, Montreal, Canada).
11 However, Spielmann also points at the unavoidable connotations that the term 'video art' carries. In particular, 
she brings the examples of the artistic performance of video and the artist's video and suggests that despite 
the explicit distinction between these two forms of artistic expression, they both exist under the umbrella 
term 'video art' (Spielmann 2010: 74-75). 
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medium that consists of electrical signals, and therefore, it can easily change its form and
direction. For this reason, she suggests, video signal can freely  mutate into sound, and vice
versa. By the same token, such a signaletic property endows video with a special flexibility
and plasticity that, in  Spielmann's view, constitute a set of the key characteristics of artistic
videos (Ibid.). 
In turn, Rush and Ross both concentrate on the temporalities of video claiming the
latter to be the “art of time” (Rush 2007: 8) and the time-maker (Ross 2006: 83). From their
point of view, unlike all other art media, a specific hallmark of artistic video is its obvious
temporality. For Ross, video art is a time-based form of art, and for this reason, it has the
ability to 'make' and alter time by means of either considering the latter as an artistic material
(and  thus,  employ  the  techniques  of  delay,  extension  and  repetition),  or  disrupt  its
conventionality and artificiality (Ibid.). For Rush, he likewise points out that video is used by
artists to manipulate time, expose its multiple layers, and break “the barriers between past,
present, and future” (Rush 2007: 10). However, in connection to time, he also stresses the
significance  of  a  concept  of  real  time  for  the  thorough  understanding  of  a  video  art
phenomenon.
Acknowledging the importance of real time in video art and also attempting to provide
the chronological timeframe, Blom proposes to think of video art as an agency with a limited
lifespan. According to her, the phenomenon of video art emerges around the time when TV
producers became finally able to record the signaletic transmission on videotape (in the late
1950s), and it ends when analog video has been made obsolete by the digital platforms (in the
late  1980-early  1990s)  (Blom 2013).  As it  reasonably derives  from Blom's  definition,  all
video works that are produced after 'digitization' should rather be located in the domain of
new media than in  the  realm of video art.  Pushing this idea to  the maximum,  Ross also
suggests that in the era of the digital, video art becomes “merely a digital extension of our
digital lives where any image, sound, or word can be processed, played out or manipulated at
will  … .”  (Ross  2006:  89).  For  this  reason,  she  concludes,  digital  video  art  should  be
considered in the larger context of hybrid media in which the specificity of the medium is lost
in favour of its capacity for remediation. 
Finally, among the scholars who privilege the role of the video phenomenon in the
broader framework of art, the viewpoints of Rosler and  Sturken are especially illustrative.
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Thus, Rosler develops a thesis in which video art is considered as a form of a technologically
informed critique of mainstream Western culture (Rosler 1996 [1985]). From her perspective,
the remarkable feature of video art is its ability to point at the proliferation of culture industry
in Western society, as well as in the art institutions existing inside it. This latter approach to
define video art is based on the critical potentiality which, according to Rosler, is hidden in
video art. However, in this critical venture, she also recognises the naive utopian attempt of
video art “to redefine the system out of existence by merging art with social life and making
“audience”  and “producer”  interchangeable”  (Ibid.:  259).  Sturken,  in turn,  emphasises the
explicit ideological context in which video art came to light. In her opinion, the history of
video has been constructed by both artists and art institutions: whereas the former sought to
design the powerful tool for revolts and experiments, the latter sought to defend their fundings
by emphasising the innovative properties of a new medium (Sturken 1990). 
At this point, therefore, it becomes clear that no unity exists in definitions of video art,
and for this reason, I think, my paper can to some extent also contribute to these debates by
helping to discern specific features of video art as an independent art form and elaborate on
some of the open questions in this field. In order to do so, in the following passage, I sketch
the brief characteristic of video as both a form of technology and an artistic medium, loosely
compare it to closely related technologies of television and cinema, and finally, outline the
most relevant features of video art that I intend to use for my modeling. 
2.4. Relevant Characteristics of Video Art
Because of the uncertain position of video in art in which the former, despite being in all
respects influenced by technology, simultaneously carried out the functionality of the artistic
medium, video developed its own technological idiosyncrasy that differs from closely related
technologies of television and cinema, and obtained the unique potentiality to influence at the
level of aesthetics. 
When in 1965 Sony Corporation introduced first Portapaks – the portable recording
and playback systems – it gave an access to video technology for people outside the television
industry and the military circles12. Broadcast television was already fully institutionalised and
12 The first portable equipment was developed in the early 1960s by the US army for surveillance purposes in 
Vietnam (Elwes 2005: 3)
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successfully employed for the commercial and political purposes by the private corporations
protected  by  government13.  Mainstream  cinema,  likewise,  served  for  the  interests  of  the
culture industry and sustained the social environment for the fertile propagation of 'useful'
information in society. However, video in the context of art was never fully institutionalized
in the same way as television and cinema were, even though the former has clearly adopted
technological features of both other media. Such an appropriation of technology invested with
artistic flexibility and freedom, in turn, determined the discursive character of video as an art
medium, and also outlined its unique communicative hallmark in the eyes of many artists. 
In the essay “Video: The Distinctive Features of the Medium”, Antin (1986) analyses
the  consequences  of  the  technological  affinity  of  video  and  television  and  stresses  that
televisual  industry has directly  defined the formal  and technical  properties of early video
technology. Like television, video technology, he elaborates, is based on the transmission of
signals,  when  input  images  are  converted  to  electrical  impulses,  which  could  in  turn  be
received as output images at another location. In this signaletic structure of video technology
Antin recognises the blueprint for the top-bottom information exchange in society in which
communication  is  deeply  grounded  into  asymmetrical  relation  between  'sending'  and
'receiving'14. Such an inequality of the information exchange, according to Antin, derives not
only from the hierarchical relations in society but also is reflected economically, because the
transmission of the signal is obviously more expensive than its reception (Ibid.). 
At the same time, in contrast to television and mainstream cinema, in video art, the
audience plays a very specific role. On one hand, such a specificity is determined by the
nature of art in which an artwork becomes complete only when an artist receives the feedback
from his audience and vice versa. Since people who first started to experiment artistically with
the medium of video were mainly educated as artists or thought of themselves in this way,
they by extension projected these artist-audience relationships on their works. On the other, it
was briefly mentioned, video artists sought to expand the possibilities of communicating the
medium far  beyond  the  standard  chains  of  transmission.  And  video  technology,  with  its
13 Such a scheme was developed in the USA. However, when in 1967 and 1969 the Congress established the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) for the purpose of 
giving the chance to get the federal fundings for a new fundamental institution in the USA, it opened the 
access to television for artists (Kathy Rae Huffman 1990). At the same time, in Europe, according to Rush, 
television had been highly centralized, usually under the auspices of government sponsorship (Rush 2007).
14 Although Antin discusses mostly the American society, this structure is applicable to the European world as 
well. 
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immediate  interactivity,  perfectly  suited  for  these  purposes  (Rush 2007).  For  this  reason,
Rush's  ambitious  conclusion  that  video  medium  (in  both  technological  and  artistic
applications)  has  the  ability  to  synthesise  all  the  forms  in  which  human  communication
presents  itself  does  not  sound  eccentric  even today.  Elaborating  on  this  statement,  Rush
additionally points at the participatory role of audiences in video art that stood as an essential
“component of the experiment” (Ibid.: 36). By doing so, he highlights the interactive features
of video art that to some extent places viewers at the centre of the stage. 
The  questions  of  interactivity  of  video  as  an  art  form is  at  heart  of  Spielmann's
writings who, unlike Rush, stresses the specific “shared” creativity that arises between artists
and the camera in the process of making artistic videos  (Spielmann 2004: 22). Spielmann's
latter statement is of particular importance here since it endows me with the premise to think
of video art in terms of its openness to the outside world – its liveness and affectiveness that
are discussed in detail in the Chapter 4. Apart from this, the interactive nature of video art is
additionally emphasised by means of the simultaneity of creation and display of video works.
In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  stress  once  again  the  'real-timeness'  of  video  as  a
fundamental property of video image. From the artistic point of view, one of the immediate
results of such a performativity of video is the ability to “continuously modify the sequence”
that  eventually “gives a great amount of variations” and allows to observe the process of
image formation (Steina Vasulka in Haller 1981 [1980]: 2). Vasulka's statement additionally
points at the very particular form of interaction of a video camera (or other modes used to
generate  video  image)  and  an  artist,  implying  their  cooperative,  almost  synergetic
communication. 
Given to the previously mentioned technological similarity of television and video, the
latter,  however,  when  lodged  into  video  art,  did  not  promise  the  scope  of  traditional
entertainment  inherent  in  television,  since  video  as  an  art  form  offers  a  very  specific
interaction, immanent to every artistic medium. Whereas television is characterised by the
extreme time segmentation and the skilful ability to retain viewers' attention that has in turn
derived from its precise structure and explicitly commercial  interest,  art videos are mostly
boring,  slow  and  uninformative15.  From  this  perspective,  Ross  elaborates  on  the  special
15 It is important to mention though, video can be boring if it is juxtaposed with the 'entertaining' mass-media 
technologies such as television and mainstream cinema. However, if put in line with other art practices such 
as experimental film, photography, painting, sculpture, it makes pointless to stress the boredom of video art 
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temporality of the video medium, its ability to alter time and expose its artificial linearity. For
video artists, such a boredom eventually became a part of an aesthetic strategy in which time
was  extended, sampled, cut in fragments and repeated in infinite loops. In doing so, video
artists, according to Ross, attempted to surpass the optical means of the video medium in
favour of the “mentalization of the image”16 (Ross 2006: 98). In this regard, the temporality of
video can be conceptualised as a kind of 'upgraded consciousness' – the attempt to expand the
boarders of 'visible reality' and extend the abilities of the mind. 
Another important feature of video art in contrast to television and cinema is the lack
of proper editing. In television, the smoothness of transition is of high importance due to its
already mentioned hypnotic power to hold attention and make the viewer accustomed to the
high transition rate. In cinema, especially its mainstream form, skilful editing is the key to the
appealing narration and, by the same token, the path to commercial success. For video art, the
situation is quite the opposite: here the stability of an image was considered as insignificant,
partly due to costly editing technology, and partly due to aesthetic reasons17. Moreover, in the
process  of  making  artistic  videos,  the  human  factor  is  of  particular  significance.  Unlike
broadcast television, which seemingly exists on its own without any particular person behind
its technical side but the characters on the screen, in video art, the presence of artists behind
the camera is absolutely tangible and defined through the unique aesthetic approach that every
artist uses in his own manner. Hence the accentuated attention to the aesthetics of video rather
than  to  the  quality  of  a  video  image.  With  time,  such a  low quality  of  video became a
hallmark  of  early  video  art  and  eventually  distinguished  this  medium  from  all  other
technically influenced media.
In stark contrast to the explicit objectives of commercial television and mainstream
cinema, the main idea behind video art ever since its emergence was to challenge habitual
understanding of time and space, investigate the significance of perception by pushing it to
the limits and explore the identities of artist and viewers. From this perspective, video opens
broad possibilities to alter perception and transform the habitual mode of thinking about the
(Antin 1986).  
16 Today, as she compares, artists are more preoccupied with the destruction of representation, debunking of 
historical narratives or disclosure of cultural myths, and for this reason, the temporality of video, so essential 
for early video art, was eventually eclipsed by explicitly political questions.
17 However, it is only true in relation to early video art. After digitization, heavy editing became ubiquitous and 
a majority of artists have started to experiment with non-linear computer editing.
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world that surrounds us. By reflecting the world in its dynamic motion, video does not merely
record the movement,  but also  acts upon the world and interacts with its movement. This
property of video, in turn, is directly informed by its signaletic nature that, in my opinion, is
the key towards understanding video art in its complexity. Since the question of signaletic
properties of video is elucidated in detail in the following chapters, with regard to such a
special connection of video with the physical world, I would like to add the last remark on
representation.  More  specifically,  as  I  attempt  to  show,  video  as  an  intriguing  artistic
phenomenon, in most cases, escapes representation. By this I mean that artistic videos can
fully be appreciated if the representational concern is reduces to minimum. By no means,
there exist many artworks that deliberately deal with the notion of representation and try to
expose its alleged artificiality. At the same time, I want to suggest that this kind of artworks,
in my opinion, provides less ground for the understanding of the nature of video as a unique
artistic phenomenon. In the following, I come back to the question of representation in video
art and elucidate my point of view based on the particular examples. 
As I  attempted to  show, video art  grew from a fascination with media,  interest  in
technology, and belief to tame both media and technology for the sake of further expansion of
creative  imagination.  During  video  art's  evolution,  artist  working  with  video  situated
themselves in opposition to the electronic broadcasting of institutional television on one hand,
and tried to differentiate video art from commercial cinema, on the other. Thus, despite both
broadcast  television  and video art  are  initially  based  on the  transmission  of  signals,  and
cinema and video can easily be approximated as almost similar modes of expression,  the
latter, however, developed a number of characteristics that can be attributed specifically to
video art. Thus, it acknowledged a participatory role of viewers, and by default, incorporated
the feedback from audience as an important part of interactivity inherent in the video medium.
Such a  participatory role of audience was additionally informed by the immediacy of real-
time video and its openness to the world. Furthermore, video artists developed a special form
of temporality based on the aesthetics of boredom, which can to some extent be assigned to
the majority of the artworks in much broader context of art. Apart from this, video art (its
early form in particular) pursued a mode of visual expression that was initially based on low
quality of video images and raw editing. Finally, video, due to its transformability, immediacy
and instantaneity, acquired the ability to  interact with the continuos movement of the world
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and act upon it. 
Within the broader scope of characteristics of video art, such features of video as its
signaletic modality, a special kind of temporality, capacity to react upon the world and interact
with artists and viewers on its own manner, along with the ability to challenge perception are
of particular interest to me. First, they help to inquire into the very specific attributes of video
art in more detail, and to differentiate the latter from other closely related art forms such as art
cinema, performance, installations and digital media art. Second, they help to establish a more
coherent connection between video art and the concept of memory in Bergson and draw the
analogical  relations  on  the  different  levels.  Finally,  these  particular  features  provide  the
ground for better understanding of early analog video art with respect to digital media art, and
thus, to some extent, can point at the differences between analog and digital modes of artistic
expression in video art. 
2.5. Image Technicians: Choice of Artists
In the attempts  to  define the unique characteristics  of  the new artistic  medium, video art
encapsulated a broad variety of creative possibilities for artists. In turn, this aspect finds its
evidence in the lucidity of artistic approaches towards the exploration of the medium. 
Spielmann defines three18 major movements towards which artists were leaning while
incorporating video in their art practices (Spielmann 2010). The first movement approached
video as a tool for installing a new form of alternative television – radically democratic media
think tank19. Such collectives as “Radical Software group”, “Raindance”, the “Experimental
Television Center” can be the illustrative representatives of this group. In their practice, video
was employed as a form of societal aid and an activist's tool.  Gene Youngblood, one of the
first video theoreticians and prominent video artists, writes that for the artists sought to create
the project of social change, video manifested the “hope to present a new attitude from a new
generation of TV management” (Youngblood 1970: 282).
18 It is worth to mention that there exist many different classifications of video. In the history of video art, one 
of the commonly accepted classifications discerns four categories of video artists: video-documentary, image 
processing, performance, and installation (Furlong 1983a.) For this paper, however, Spielmann's 
classification is employed, since it groups performance and installation together and makes a particular 
accent on the experimental videos.
19 This is the big aim of the video artists who belonged to the first group as it is being described on the web-site 
of the joint project of the Radical Software group and the Raindance Corporation (radicalsoftware.org).
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The second group is closely related to such significant for art history phenomena as
Happening,  Fluxus,  Performance,  and  Installation  arts.  These  artists  lodged  video  in  the
breadth of their  conceptual artistic  projects  in order to “expand and transgress the “white
cube” and perform perceptual experiments”. In their close affiliation with art, Richard Serra,
Keith  Sonnier,  Lynda  Benglis,  Nancy  Holt,  Vito  Acconci,  Bruce  Nauman,  and  William
Wegman represent this group at best (Spielmann 2004). 
Finally, the last chunk of video artists, 'image technicians' or 'video technicians', as
Spielmann defines them, is of particular interest to me. By experimenting with the medium in
various ways, from merely technical to the explicitly artistic, artists from this group strived to
bridge  aesthetics  and  technology,  and  in  doing  so,  sought  to  invent  a  new  modality  of
interaction between human and machine. In this connection,  'video technicians'  reflect  the
problematic aspects of video art as both technology and an art form, and also help to better
understand the art medium of video at work. Nam June Paik, Gary Hill, Dan Sandin, Steina
and  Woody  Vasulka,  Eric  Siegel,  Peter  Campus,  and  Stephen  Beck  are  the  main
representatives of this direction20.  They approached video dialogically and innovatively,  at
once  in  its  technical  autonomy  and  its  unified  connection  with  video  artists.  Unlike  the
'alternative television' movement and performative artists, 'image technicians' were looking
for  audiovisual  aesthetics  that  deviates  from the  “preceding  camera-obscura  prospective”
(Spielmann 2010: 101). By merging abstraction with new signaletic technologies they strived
to define the electronic pictoriality that diverges from the representative features of images
and is based on the expressivity of video signals. Therefore, in my opinion, the experiments of
these artists articulate  the phenomenon of video art  in better  light,  since they embody all
modes of working with video from recording and preforming in real-time to processing and
synthesising video from scratch, as well as constitute the unique aesthetics of an electronic
medium. Thus, in the conversation with Spielmann, Woody Vasulka states that “the electronic
image is processed”, and Steina in turn comments that feedback is “the first true image not
20 At the same time, the division of video artists as it is explicated above is rather an artificial construction 
derived from the broader “institutional” narrative of video art on one hand, and determined by the urge to 
classify the artists, on the other. In practice however, it is almost impossible to draw a sharp line between all 
these movements, and for this reason, one artist could hold a place in all these three groups. After all, as 
Steina Vasulka comments in the interview with Lucinda Furlong: “We all knew we were interested in 
different things, like video synthesis and electronic video, which was definitely different from community 
access-type video, but we didn't see ourselves in opposite camps. We were all struggling together and we 
were all using the same tools” (Furlong 1983a.: 36).
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related to pinhole” (Ibid.: 112). In the earlier interview with Haller, Steina also stresses that
analog video is “almost never repeatable” and compares it to a musical improvisation (Haller
1981 [1980]: 2). Nam June Paik declares that video is time (Ross 2006), and Stephen Beck
claims that video is  a non-representational medium able to  subvert  the conventionality of
photography, cinema and television (Beck 1976: 184). 
Moreover,  due  to  the  relatively  apparent  detachment  from  institutional  art  and
television,  the works of the 'image-technicians'  provide  more complete  illustration for the
model of video art that I am about to construct on the basis of Bergson's concept of memory.
Given that the process of making video is in the focus of my work, on the following pages I
concentrate on the questions of how video works, what place in this process is reserved for the
artist, and what possible outcome it can bring into art. From such a perspective, the artists
from the last  group bring attention to  the specific  features of video such as its signaletic
nature,  interactivity,  reflexivity  and  instantaneity  of  real-time  videos.  In  addition,  video
processing and video synthesis employed by these artists introduce the form of transition from
entirely  analog  video  to  entirely  digital  and  help  to  grasp  this  process  in  its  vibrant
complexity.  In relation to memory, these video practices, I offer, reflect the mechanism of
memory at work – when it undertakes a long path starting from the discernment of the past
images from matter via contraction, and ends in the embodied perception of the past in the
present. 
At the same time, it is important to mention that video works of the 'image-technicians'
in  many  aspects  differ  from  the  works  created  by  other  two  groups,  especially,  by
performative  artists  who  leaned  towards  more  political,  critical,  and  therefore,  more
'interpretative' modes of video expression. In this regard, I understand that the approximate
model of video art that I want to propose in connection to memory in the theory of Bergson
will  eventually  be  limited  to  one  particular  movement.  However,  in  my  opinion,  by
incorporating technological properties of video and combining them with the artistic practice,
the artist from latter movement managed to approach the question of video art in a more
profound manner. In other words, the 'image-technicians' not only recognised and appreciated
specific properties of video as a new medium based on signal but also extensively explored
these properties in their works on one hand, and indirectly promoted specific features of video
with  respect  to  art,  on  the  other.  Furthermore,  because  video  art  is  a  very  complex
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phenomenon that encompasses a big variety of movements, which in turn have their own
problems and specificities, I feel the necessity to narrow down my research for the sake of
better clarity and more accurate focus. However, bearing in mind the 'transformative' potential
of metaphorical modeling, I hope that my findings and conclusions with respect to the 'image
technicians' can to some extent be applied to the analysis of other categories of video art. But
before considering video art and the works of the artists of my preference more thoroughly, I
would like to proceed with the explanation of memory in the theory of Bergson and to sketch
a model which I employ in the further discussion. 
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3. Sketching the Model of Memory
The following chapter describes the model of memory proposed by Henri Bergson in the late
19 – first half of the 20th century and discusses the mechanism of memory in detail. Different
sections that I provide in the chapter are meant to introduce the reader into such important
composites of Bergson's concept of memory as pure and conscious memory, sensori-motor
habit-memory, pure and conscious perception, as well as to explain their functions  at great
length  in  the  context  of  Bergson's  elaborated  theory.  Particular  attention  is  payed  to  the
concepts of duration and the body that altogether determine the functionality of memory in
Bergson. In doing so, I follow Bergson's original texts and bolster my own interpretation with
Deleuze's attentive reading of Bergson. In addition, to precede possible confusions, the most
ambiguous speculations are supported by Bergson's quotes given in the related paragraphs. 
At this point, it is more important not to construct the precise model of memory, but to
understand how memory works in Bergson's philosophy, since exactly this knowledge makes
it possible to project the model of memory that derives from the theory of Bergson on video
art and otherwise. 
3.1. Structural Parts of Bergson's Theory of Memory
Henri Bergson's definition of memory is grounded on his original theory of the mind that was
initially meant not only to solve the mind-body problem and bring science and philosophy to
a new agreement  but also attempted to go beyond the human condition21 (Ansell  Pearson
21 At the time of Bergson's intellectual activity, most of philosophers, mathematicians and physicists sought to 
establish an innovative connection between the mind (as consciousness), matter, space and time, as well as to 
find new relations between them. With regard to the mind and matter, for more than two centuries the 
Kantian model dominated in philosophy in which both the mind and matter were taken as given and the 
noumenal realm was assumed to exist beyond the phenomenal. With regard to space and time, Euclidian 3-
dimensional space and linear time were the predominant philosophical and mathematical concepts. However, 
already in the late 19-early 20th century some mathematicians and physicists understood the limits of above 
mentioned ideas and tried to find new solutions (Bernhard Riemann, Karl Friedrich Gauss, Henri Poincare 
and later, Albert Einstein who embraced the ideas of the former three scientists). In this context, Bergson by 
attacking Kant on one side and challenging mathematical concepts of space and time, on the other, argued for 
the empirical intuition as the possibility of absolute knowledge and a new kind of time that leaves the room 
for freedom, claiming that “space and time never overlap” (Deleuze 1991: 85).
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2007).  In  order  to  shed  light  on  Bergson's  concepts  of  memory,  a  brief  clearance  of
'Bergsonism'  is  vital,  since  memory  is  conceived  as  an  indispensable  part  of  Bergson's
elaborate philosophy. 
Unlike cognitive theories of memory22 which generally closely relate memory with
perception on one hand, and assert that memory can be preserved in the brain and then later
accessed via the process of recollection, on the other, Bergson argues that memory, by no
means, can be conceptualised as a perception in a weakened state. For the most part , Bergson
indeed confirms that memory and perception mutually influence each other. At the same time
though,  he  highlights  that  these  two  notions  are  not  alike,  and  conceives  memory
independently via its unique modality of being. Furthermore, for Bergson, the whole process
of recollection does not start with perception, but in contrast, finalises itself in perception. 
As a materialist philosopher, Bergson strongly believes in the physical existence of
matter – a substance the world is made of. The material world, he tells us, is an “aggregate of
'images'”:
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 'images.' And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is
more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing
– an existence placed halfway between the 'thing' and the 'representation.'” (Bergson 1911: 14).
These  images  at  once  coexist  together  without  any  form,  centre  or  direction,  acting  and
reacting upon each other.  In contrast to future semiology in which the connection between
reality and the interpretation of reality is to a large extent symbolic and mainly based on
language, Bergson believes in the existence of a material connection between reality and our
comprehension of reality.  The world, for Bergson, is the field of physical forces and non-
organic intensities ungraspable in practice but apprehended via a metaphor of pure perception.
Noteworthy, perception in Bergson starts on periphery – outside of the subject – and gradually
fades towards the centre – into the body (Lazzarato 2007). Hence his distinction between two
types of perception: ontological (pure) and conscious.
22 Today, among the contemporary disciplines that are mostly associated with studies of human memory, the 
leading are neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and some fields in-between, such as cognitive neuroscience 
and neuropsychology. Drawing on biology and cybernetics, these disciplines describe memory as information 
that is retained in different locations of our brain, and can later be accessed by means of the processes 
associated with recollection. According to these studies, memory starts with sensual perceptions, which then 
are decoded in the cortex and stored in different parts of the brain. In the act of recollection, scattered in the 
brain chunks of information are reassembled once again into a coherent whole in order to re-create the past 
experience. Therefore, the stages of memory formation are described as a complex action consisted of three 
operations: encoding, storage and retrieval (Gazzaniga 2009).
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Pure perception, according to Bergson, is the perception without recollection of the
previous perceptual experience, and for this reason, it is capable of giving us hints into the
immediate nature of matter. It is freed from any representational associations, actualised in the
instantaneous  present,  and  “exists  in  theory  rather  than  in  fact”  (Bergson  1911:  26).  In
contrast,  conscious perception is the perception mediated by our mind, inflated by image-
memories and limited by the actual needs. Due to this limitation, conscious perception cannot
encompass the whole of matter and only perceives 'by isolation' – that which interests the
mind. As Deleuze aptly put commenting on Bergson's idea of conscious perception, it is “not
the object plus something, but the object minus something, minus everything that does not
interest us” (Deleuze 1991: 25). In the process of conscious perception, the perceived object
blends with a pure perception, while our conscious perception in turn blends with the object
and discerns those properties of the object that are of particular interest to our mind. In other
words,  when  perceiving  the  stimuli  of  the  environment,  we  move  from  sensing  the
environment as it is – in whole its mystery and ungraspable material purity – towards the
specific features of the environment that are of interest to us. 
At this point, it  is important to stress that perception (both pure or ontological and
conscious or also psychological) is a very important concept in the theory of Bergson. More
specifically,  it  is  the  inseparable  element  of  memory,  because  perception  is  precisely
something  that  actualises  memory  in  the  body.  Since  Bergson  describes  the  process  of
recollection  in  reverse,  in  order  to  fully  appreciate  the  logic  of  such  a  process,  I  move
backwards, starting with perception and progressing with memory. This aspect is elucidated in
the following chapters, when I start to compare memory and video (especially, when I draw
the analogy between the materialisation of video and actualisation of memory in the Chapter
4.3). In fact, if I am to bluntly separate memory from perception,  it  can be assumed that
memory in Bergson's theory comes to existence prior  conscious  perception and ends in it.
However, I am making this separation only for the sake of better clarity, otherwise it cannot
be done by any means. Pure perception, in turn, exists independently as a potentiality, it is a
perception without memory, or something that we can neither access, nor apprehend. 
Likewise, memory, according to Bergson, is split to two: one, pure memory, that is
unattainable and exists independently as an image in its original and immediate state, and the
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other – conscious memory23 – by which we can access the environment via the synchronised
activity of the mind and the body. This type of memory is of particular interest to me in this
work, since, in my opinion,  it  can be transposed onto video art  in the form of a kind of
mediation between the intensities of the world on one hand, and the camera and artists on the
other. As Bergson himself stressed, pure memory is useless for our mind because it does not
derive from a mind's operation but endures on its own. At the same time though, as I am to
explain in the following, pure memory together with pure perception, according to Bergson,
plays an important role in the process of recollection of the past, and therefore, these two
cannot be excluded from the model of memory which I try to create based on the theory of
Bergson.
 Conscious memory in turn also embodies two sub-memories which could loosely be
situated in the body and the mind:
There are, we have said, two memories which are profoundly distinct: the one, fixed in the organism, is
nothing else but the complete set of intelligently constructed mechanisms which ensure the appropriate
reply to  the various  possible  demands.  This  memory enables  us  to  adapt ourselves  to  the  present
situation; through it the actions to which we are subject prolong themselves into reactions that are
sometimes accomplished, sometimes merely nascent, but always more or less appropriate. Habit rather
than memory, it acts our past experience but does not call up its image. The other is the true memory.
Coextensive with consciousness, it retains and ranges alongside of each other all our states in the order
in which they occur, leaving to each fact its place and, consequently, marking its date, truly moving in
the past and not, like the first, in an ever renewed present” (Bergson 1911: 195).
As it derives from the quote, memory that is stored in our body is a habit-memory – “sensori-
motor  systems organised by habit” (Ibid.:  193). This kind of memory constitutes a set  of
automatic  bodily  remembrances  of  previous  conscious  perceptions  and,  strictly  speaking,
determines our survival by laying the ground for our conscience being and maintaining our
spatial,  motor,  optical,  and  other  activities.  Whereas  Bergson  calls  it  “habit  rather  than
memory”,  Deleuze refers to this type of memory as memory-recollection (Deleuze 1991).
Another aspect of conscious memory is the type of memory that coexists with consciousness
and retains the past in a set of intelligent remembrances. Deleuze calls this type memory-
contraction  and claims that  despite  the  latter  is  more  profound,  both  aspects  –  memory-
23 In different works and even different paragraphs of the same text, Bergson also calls this type of memory 
either a recollection, or true memory, or even a psychological memory. On one hand, it can be the result of 
the various translations, on the other, all these three also could stand for the synonymical expressions of the 
form of memory, which he opposes to pure memory. In both cases, it creates additional difficulties for the 
comprehension of Bergson's already complex theory of memory. In order to carry the sharp distinction 
between pure memory and memory that is opposed to it, I will keep referring to the latter as conscious 
memory. 
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recollection and memory-contraction – equally constitute the notion of memory in Bergson. In
the  Chapter  4.3,  I  explain  the  four-stage  process  of  actualisation  of  pure  memory  in
conscience  memory:  translation,  rotation,  dynamic  memory and mechanical  memory.  The
latter is precisely something that I understand as a habit-memory: it is tied to sensori-motor
mechanisms in the body and has already partly blended with perception. Given that memory
in Bergson begins as memory of the past and accomplishes itself in perception of the present,
a habit-memory, I think, is a transitional stage between memory and perception. In  Matter
and Memory, Bergson explains the co-existence of two memories with better clearance: 
… bodily memory, made up of the sum of the sensori-motor systems organized by habit, is then a quasi-
instantaneous memory to which the true memory of the past serves as base. Since they are not two
separate things, since the first  (the bodily memory) is only,  as we have said, the pointed end, ever
moving, inserted by the second (the true memory of the past) in the shifting plane of experience, it is
natural that the two functions should lend each other a mutual support. So, on the one hand, the memory
of the past offers to the sensori-motor mechanisms all the recollections capable of guiding them in their
task and of giving to the motor reaction the direction suggested by the lessons of experience. It is in just
this that the associations of contiguity and likeness consist. But, on the other hand, the sensori-motor
apparatus furnish to ineffective, that  is unconscious,  memories,   the means of taking on a body, of
materializing themselves,  in  short  of  becoming present.  For,  that  a  recollection should reappear in
consciousness, it  is necessary that it  should descend from the heights of pure memory down to the
precise point where action is taking place. (1911: 132)
Now, in order to understand the mechanism of memory at work, I need to connect all
these perceptions and memories together. For Bergson, the simultaneous operations of pure
memory, conscience memory and conscience perception are identified by our mind as a single
movement.  However,  as  he  suggests,  in  this  process,  “consciousness  only  follows  the
movement of memory at work” (Ibid.: 171). In fact, what takes place is the actualisation of
pure  memory in  conscious  memory  that  in  turn  is  experienced  as  perception  of  the  past
actualised in the present. Perception, therefore, is “never simply a contact of the mind with a
present  object”,  it  is  the  actualisation  of  the  past  images  “coordinated  with  a  present
perception” that  comes as  a  result  of  the  reciprocal  influence  of  conscious  memory  and
conscious  perception  (Ibid.:  97).  Hence  the  mechanism  of  forgetting  which,  following
Bergson,  is  explained  through  the  incompatibility  of  a  simultaneous  coexistence  of  past
images and present perception. Because of this, images of the past previously retained by our
consciousness cannot be rendered by perception, and by the same token, cannot be actualised
in our body. It can be concluded that the more past is conserved by our conscious memory
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(consciousness), the more active recognition can take place, and the more freedom for future
actualisation unfolds before us.
As I have stated in the beginning, Bergson sought the difference between  conscious
memory and conscious perception as a matter of kind, not degree. Insisting that “to picture is
not to remember”, he thought of perception as neither a recollection, nor a contemplation, and
memory as neither embodied sensations, nor a weakened perception (Ibid.: 173). “There is no
perception  which  is  not  full  of  memories”,  Bergson  writes  when  he  contemplates  the
reciprocal influence of perception and memory, yet he insists  that these two have distinct
nature: whereas memory is active and continuous duration able to extract the images of the
past from the universe,  perception is  the actual embodiment  of the images in  the present
(Ibid.: 33).
Another crucial point to keep in mind is that for Bergson, neither subject, nor object,
nor the perception of the object can create images, because a subject and an object are already
images – they consist  of matter.  In the act of perception,  we only withdraw from matter,
arresting its movement and discerning the contraction of duration: it “is neither cause, nor
effect, nor, in any sense, the duplicate: it simply continues perception, perception being our
virtual  action  and the  cerebral  state  our  commanded action”  (Bergson,  1993:  262).  As it
follows, memory is not preserved in our brain and can, by no means, be retained by our mind
in the similar fashion as it  is done,  for instance by computers today. The latter statement
emphasises the interactive (or indexical in Deleuze) side of memory and, by extension, the
affective capacities of video as an art medium when this conception of memory is projected
on video art. 
3.2. Memory as Duration 
To make the illustration of Bergson's mechanism of memory 'at work' complete, the next, and
probably  the  most  important  functional  element  should  be  considered  in  detail.  More
specifically, the concept of duration, which is to be compared to the expressivity of light and
signal, and the specific temporality of video, is of particular interest to me here. 
Memory of the past, it was suggested, is not stored somewhere in the brain, it unfolds
in time through the prolongation of the past into the present. These two latter concepts though
distinct  in  nature,  can  nevertheless  be  reconciled  by  the  actions  of  memory.  Moreover,
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following Bergson, there exist different layers of the past, as well as different images of the
past (from which memories are constructed) are placed on this layers. Memory should be first,
placed into action in order to discern the images of the past from the homogenous past, (in
other words, differentiate itself from matter and become duration) and then, second, must be
actualised in the present perception which makes these images 'alive' and complete. This is
why, as Bergson claimed, memory is the interface between virtual and actual, a carrier of the
past into the present in time (Bergson 1911). 
In turn, time, as Bergson conceptualises it, is not a set of discrete movements, but a
non-chronological continuous duration that cannot be broken, and for this reason, it “excludes
all  idea of juxtaposition, reciprocal externality and extension”24 (Bergson  1912:  13). More
precisely,  duration is  the temporality of consciousness and the very materialisation of our
conscious memory. Duration as we experience it, or psychological duration, is only one case
among others, among an infinity of other durations (Deleuze 1991).  What  is important to
understand, however, is that in Bergson, though indivisible, duration nevertheless reacts and
produces difference. To explain this in better context, Deleuze's elaborate interpretation of
duration is further employed. 
In “Bergson's  Conception of  Difference”,  Deleuze  proposes  that  “duration  is  what
differs from itself” (2004 [1956]: 37). By this he means that it possesses the capacity to split
itself into two inseparable moments, one of which falls back towards the past, while the other
is projected towards the future. Space, according to Deleuze's reading of Bergson, consists of
matter  and  duration,  and  while  matter  exists  entirely  in  “relaxation”  –  a  state  in  which
moments of time exist outside each other in an un-synthesized manner (Ansell Pearson 2007),
duration differentiates  itself  from matter  throughout  the  mechanisms of “contraction” and
“relaxation” (Deleuze 2004 [1956]: 39). Thus, movement can be explained by infusion of
duration into matter in which duration differentiates from matter and from itself.  In other
words,  following  Deleuze's  interpretation  of  Bergson,  whereas  matter  only  repeats  itself,
duration also contracts itself, and through this very mechanism, transforms matter25 (Ibid.). 
In the process of such a contraction, duration changes its nature and actualises virtual
possibilities of matter that in turn finds the embodiment in memory. Although the mechanism
24 Hence the notorious debates between Bergson and Einstein. 
25 This will be one of the main premises for Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, in which he develops the 
concepts of difference in itself and repetition for itself as the key notions of creation. 
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of  duration  is  additionally  employed  in  the  Chapter  4.4,  for  now I  feel  the  necessity  to
highlight  the methodological role of duration as a pivotal link between memory and video.
Since duration in Bergson is inseparable of memory, it creates a premise to think of the former
as light that makes video images (matter) visible to us. However, in order to fully understand
the mechanism of duration, I should additionally trace its connection to conscious memory. 
Duration for Bergson is the condition for the possibility of freedom and choice (Ansell
Pearson 2007). In this process, the particular importance is assigned to memory that conserves
past experience in order to make it 'happen' again in the future. Since memory is thought in
terms of continuous duration, it  directly determines the scope of our freedom through the
unfolding the past in the present. Deleuze describes duration as a condition of experience in
which “the  recollection or what  has happened in space  would already imply a  mind that
endures” (Deleuze 1991: 37).
Noteworthy, for both Bergson and Deleuze, duration has to be granted an absolute
existence (it is not relative to our own inner sense of time), which requires thinking time on a
different plane to space (Ansell Pearson 2007). “Everything happens as if the universe were a
tremendous Memory”, writes Deleuze when he interprets the nature of Bergsonian duration
(Deleuze  1991:  77).  In  a  more  elaborate  analysis  of  Bergson's  concept  of  duration  as
difference26,  Deleuze  conceives  memory  as  “the  coexistence  of  degrees  of  difference”
(Deleuze 2004 [1956]: 39). More specifically, for Deleuze, memory is a necessary condition
for virtual possibilities to be actualised in the present. “The role of memory”, he explains, “is
to give the virtuality of duration itself an objective consistency which makes it a concrete
universal,  and enable it  to actualize itself”  (Ibid.:  44).  In other words,  memory is  always
virtual, its very progress lies in the process of its materialization, in the fusion of the virtual
and the actual together. For this reason, memory always coexists with present that recalls it,
and this kind of contemporaneousness of the past and the present, the virtual and the actual,
memory and perception is something that makes the latter a peculiar concept in Bergson's
theory. 
For Deleuze, memory is the consciousness of difference, it is the ability to bring the
26 In the process of this analysis, Deleuze draws a clear distinction between three stages of difference, namely, 
between duration, memory, and élan vital. According to his distinction, duration is “difference from itself”, 
memory is “the coexistence of degrees of difference” and élan vital is “the differentiation of difference” 
(2004 [1956]: 39). 
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differentiation into action. In turn, pure (ontological) memory is something that does not act,
yet by this, it  establishes the enormous storage of all the possibilities for the moments of
virtual-actual or conscience memory. As Bergson put it: “what I call 'my present' has one foot
in my past and another in my future” (Bergson 1911: 177). There are several moments in this
quote that need explanation. First,  that to which he refers as the 'present'  is  an undivided
whole of movements and sensations that are linked together, and in this unity, they have the
ability to prolong the present moment in action. Bergson calls this present 'sensori-motor'.
Second, it implies the importance of the body that simultaneously experiences sensations and
executes movements. In this sense, body is a locale in which both sensations and movements
are given together. This is why, for Bergson, the present moment arrives as “a thing absolutely
determined”, and contrasting with the past (Ibid.: 178). To see this mechanism in detail, I need
to elaborate on the currently ambiguous function of the body. The key idea is to think of the
body as a centre of action for conscious memory, the link that unites memory, perception,
matter and duration together. 
3.3. Memory as Affective Force 
The body in Bergson is something that assembles together all the multiple elements of his
complex theory. In this regard, it is important to understand that Bergson is the thinker of
open systems (Ansell Pearson 2007). This means that for him, movement and change are the
inherent characteristics of life. The latter, with immanent to it processes of differentiation and
actualisation, is at kernel of Bergson's theoretical endeavour, and duration is the driving force
that  makes  this  actualisation  happen.  Deleuze  writes  that  in Creative  Evolution,  Bergson
compares  life  to  memory:  both  are  always  in  constant  movement,  in  the  process  of
transformation and difference. In this regard, despite bodies as living beings tend to naturally
form closed systems, it is impossible to achieve on account of the whole of life that cannot be
accomplished by definition (Deleuze 1991). 
As it was briefly mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, perception in Bergson's
theory of  memory starts  from the  outside,  on periphery,  and gradually  fades  towards  the
centre of the body. The whole perception of the universe, or perception of “the system of
images”, as Bergson defines the universe, can be altered by a slight change in the “privileged
image” – the body (Bergson 1911: 118). Perception therefore, is seen as the virtual action of
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matter. Since the body is the centre of this action, according to Bergson, it cannot “give birth
to representation” of the universe (Ibid.:  88).  Moreover,  the body itself  is  the part  of the
representation  determined  by  conscience  perception,  which  translates  the  molecular
movements of matter expressed in duration, and by this creates the 'representation'  of the
matter. What the body does, instead, is connects those things which act upon it and the things
upon which it acts. Precisely this specific functionality defines the sensori-motor phenomenon
of the  body.  By acting  and reacting,  the  body constitutes  the  actual  state  of  becoming –
duration which is always in the process of expansion.
In turn, Deleuze suggests that it is precisely memory that “makes the body something
other than instantaneous and gives it a  duration in time” (Deleuze 1991: 26). Noteworthy,
however, in Bergson's theory, the body that acts and reacts is not necessarily the 'living body'
as  we  are  accustomed  to  think  of  it.  In  contrast,  bodies,  for  Bergson,  are  the  special
'privileged' images,  which can reflect  images of matter and select  a part  of them thereby
creating the gap in the continuum of matter. Projecting Deleuze's assumption that memory
makes bodies from images, the former, therefore, are the images which have memory. Man's
body is distinguished from other reacting bodies only via the higher complexity of actions and
reactions, whereas its functional part remains the same for all other reactive bodies. This main
function  consists  of  receiving  movements,  singling  them out  and  transforming them into
action  (Lazarrato  2007).  Such  a  process,  however  multidimensional,  is  realised
instantaneously, and for this reason, cannot be 'registered' by consciousness. In fact, Bergson
highlights  that  the  experience  of  life  goes  far  beyond  the  capacities  of  the  intellect  to
comprehend this life.  What is more important, however, that conscious memory is precisely
something  that  animates  the  instantaneous chain  of  receiving,  choosing  and transforming
movements into action by the body. Now it becomes clear why, as Bergson put it, unlike
conscious memory, pure memory previously discussed on the pages above interests no part of
the body. The actual sensations, determined by the complex interplay of conscience memory
and  conscience  perception,  “occupy  definite  portions  of  the  surface”  of  the  body;  pure
memory, in contrast, exists only virtually, anticipating the moment of its materialisation. The
complete quote is following:
My actual sensations occupy definite portions of the surface of my body; pure memory, on the other
hand, interests no part of my body. No doubt, it will beget sensations as it materializes, but at that very
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moment it will cease to be a memory and pass into the state of a present thing, something actually lived.
I shall then only restore to it its character of memory by carrying myself back to the process by which I
called it up, as it was virtual, from the depths of my past. It is just because I made it active that it has
become actual, that is to say, a sensation capable of provoking movements (Bergson 1911: 128).
Now, when all the elements of Bergson's theory of memory are described in more
detail, it makes sense to draw the model of memory, which, as I have stated in the beginning,
is  be  the  pivotal  point  for  the  analysis  of  the  mechanism  of  video  art  as  an  obscure
phenomenon. Bergson himself illustrated his theory by means of an inverted rotating cone
placed on the moving plane. 
On  the  image  below,  SAB  is  the  totality  of  all  the  recollections  accumulated  in
memory. AB is situated in the past and remains immobile, and the apex S indicates the present
and constantly moves forwards touching the plane P with the actual representation of the
universe (Bergson 1911: 196-197). On one hand, the apex of the cone represents the most
contracted point of duration – the present, and on the other,  it  also indicates the point of
immersion in relaxed matter (Deleuze 1991). In other words, S is the body that acts and reacts
upon matter, it is the point at which a sensori-motor memory of the body (habit) and a true
memory of the past converge together in conscious memory and simultaneously materialise in
the present perception. 
Fig.1: Bergson's Memory Cone (Bergson 1911: 196-197)
In my opinion, though simplified, yet probably the easiest way to imagine the model
of memory based on Bergsonian illustration would be to approach it via the metaphor of a
kaleidoscope. In kaleidoscope, everything coexists with itself, like in Bergsonian cone that
stands for memory. Both cone and kaleidoscope are inherently based on movement: the cone
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rotates and moves on the plane, the kaleidoscope is mechanically spun in order to enable the
coloured objects to move and  the static particles of mirrors to reflect the motion of light.
Inasmuch as in the cone memory moves from the virtual past to the present, in kaleidoscope
the image is assembled from the virtual possibilities of all the built-in combinations. The latter
is the limitations that could stand for the restrains of our bodies, the mind and perception. The
present therefore is the most contracted past, or projecting the mechanism of a kaleidoscope
onto memory, it is the condensed point of the possible combinations for image to happen. At
the  same time  though,  whereas  every  kaleidoscope  operates  on  the  principle  of  multiple
reflexions, memory operates on the principle of multiple reactions. However, if keeping this
in mind, the metaphor of a kaleidoscope could serve as a smooth transition from Bergsonian
explanation of memory represented by the cone to video art that, unlike a pre-programmed
kaleidoscope, carries the reactive potential. 
For the most part, the ideas of Bergsonian theory of memory can be summarised in the
following statements. The universe consists of images that  act and react upon each other.
Some of these images have the privilege to become bodies because they can synthesise  the
continuum of relaxed matter and bring it to another state via duration. Movement is explained
by the insertion of duration into matter, in which the former differentiates from the latter and
from itself. Duration in turn is memory in the sense that it is characterised by the active or
intelligent recognition and has an ability to condense and discern past images from matter.
Memory is neither preserved in the brain, not it is represented by lowered perception. In the
process of recollection, we do not move from perception to recollection, or from the present to
the past, but from recollection to perception, or from the past into the present. By this, first,
memory is placed into action needed to discern the images from the past, and second, it is
transformed into perception in order to make these images alive. In this process, bodies  are
the  centre of the memory's action and the link that unites memory, perception, matter and
duration together.  
As it can easily be deduced, there exists an extensive number of arguments which aim
to criticise the theory of memory proposed by Bergson, as well as to dismantle the whole of
Bergsonian tradition27. In general, the critical evaluation bridges from the vagueness of the
27 However, apart from the general criticism, there are other reasons that contributed to the decline of Bergson's 
ideas. In particular, the influence of German philosophy on French thought after the Second World War 
shifted the accents towards phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. In addition, Bergson's distrust in 
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whole  explanation  on  one  side,  to  the  more  specific  accusations  in  intuitionism,
psychologism,  pantheism,  and  spiritualism,  on  the  other.  Among  the  famous  critics  of
Bergson  there  are  philosophers  of  temporalities  such  as  Martin  Heidegger  and  Gaston
Bachelard who criticized Bergson for conceiving duration as unity; philosophers of language
such  as  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  criticising  Bergson  for  vitalism  and  disregard  of  language;
analytical philosophers and mathematicians such as Édouard Le Roy, Bertrand Russell and
George Edward Moore who claimed that continuity is a purely mathematical subject and not
the domaine of philosophy (Ansell Pearson, Mullarkey 2002).
Deleuze himself highlighted the difficulty of Bergson's ideas and points of incoherence
in his theory. Thus, according to Deleuze, Bergson attacks dualism, degrees, intensities,  the
negative  and  opposition,  and  at  the  same time  recycles  “for  his  own purposes  the  same
notions  he  just  finished  criticizing”  (Deleuze  2004  [1956]:  49).  To  what  extent  these
criticisms are fair,  and to what extent they have been called into question by more recent
intellectual developments, are aspects that cannot be treated here. Since the aim of this paper
is not to critically evaluate the theory of Bergson but to use it in a more affirmative way, I will
not  dive  into  these debates.  What  is  of  importance is  to  acknowledge the existence  of  a
specific connection between memory and video and recognise a certain degree of similarity in
their functions. As I proposed, memory in Bergson can be analysed in its close proximity with
video art:  the former is  actualised in  the present  perception similarly to video signal that
assembles itself in the artistic image. Moreover, the immediate indeterminacy of video as a
medium and its ability to materialise the past in the present on the screen and in the body,
seem analogical to the same mechanisms of Bergsonian idea of memory. 
language as opposed to intuition, did not coincide with the linguistic turn of the 20th century. Finally, 
Bergson's fiasco in the debates with Einstein completed the task of downturning Bergson's theory. 
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4. Modeling Video Art as Memory
In this chapter, I project the model of memory described above on video art. In particular, the
connection is drawn between the operations of mind and the video camera, the four-stage
process of memory actualisation and the signaletic properties of video,  duration of memory
and the temporality of video, the vitality of duration and the continuous movement of light. In
this process, I analyse the specific characteristic of the video medium such as its signaletic
features, interactivity and connectivity, temporality and real-time immediacy in more detail in
order to elucidate their analogy with the model of memory that I build based on Bergson's
ideas. In addition, in the context of the indexicality of video art and its 'liveness', I touch upon
the problematic debates between the digital and the analog. As I assume, these debates can
bring me closer to the understanding of a specific role of analog video in the evolution of
video art, and also point at the notion of hybridisation that evolves in the field of art, media
and technology in general. In conjunction with memory and video, I also discuss the notion of
habit and briefly analyse video synthesis and video processing with regard to their ability to
expand our perception of 'reality'. Finally, assuming that  the role of an artist is fundamental
for the process of making artistic videos, in the final part of this chapter, I make an attempt to
extend the modeling of video onto the body of an artist.
In the process of drawing the analogical relations, all above mentioned features and
characteristics of video art and memory are connected together and supported by the related
examples from the artworks of the 'image-technicians'. 
4.1. The Mind and the Camera
For Bergson, the mind is a commutator that translates between movements28 in the first place.
More specifically, in Bergson's theory,  the mind stands for an instrument of the analysis of
both received and executed movements because it simultaneously transmits and divides them.
28 And by 'movement' Bergson means duration or all changes in matter: from the very faint and imperceptible to 
the changes that can be registered by means of our senses. 
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Deleuze writes that for the intellect  everything is  movement  – an “instantaneous section”
(Deleuze 1991: 54), and for this reason, the coexistent operations of pure memory, conscious
memory and conscience perception are identified by our mind as a single operation. Bergson
calls this feature the adaptation to the present situation, and by the same token, implies that
without the coordination of “the adaptive consciousness the practical character of life would
be distorted” (Ansell Pearson et al 2002: 18). 
Noteworthy,  the  mind  for  Bergson  cannot  exist  independently  of  the  rest  of  the
universe, because our ability to perceive the world directly derives from the physical bond
with the material world. If such a connection is broken, our reactive body ceases to be 'the
body' and becomes the inert matter. At the same time though, adaptation, the general aim of
life, permits us to receive and execute only a limited number of movements. This is why,
according to Bergson, the role of the mind is of high significance, because it allows only those
past images become actualised which can be acknowledged as relevant to the needs of the
present (Bergson 1911). However, despite admitting the importance of the mind, Bergson also
attacks its limitations claiming that it actually hinders the knowledge of life.
In  order  to  describe  the  operation  of  the  mind  in  more  detail  Bergson  uses  the
metaphor  of  the  film  camera.  Similarly  to  the  intellect,  which  divides  movements  and
immobilizes time, by placing images side by side along the film stripe, cinematic apparatus
substitutes  the  inner  durations  of  things  with  “a  series  of  snapshots”  of  passing  reality
(Bergson  1922:  322).  By  recomposing  them  together,  cinematography  reconstructs  the
movement from immobility. The artificially 'animated' movement, for Bergson, exists not in
the  world,  but  in  the apparatus  that  creates  a  succession of the  indivisible  movements  in
film29.  In can therefore be  inferred  that the film camera starts  from the capturing  a  'real'
movement of the world, then mechanically breaks it down into a series of single frames, and
finally, reconstructs the movement in the cinematic apparatus (Totaro 2001). In fact, Bergson
projected the same artificiality  on the human mode of acquiring the knowledge about the
world by means of intellectual apprehension and, precisely for this reason, sought to justify
29 Commenting on Bergson's critique of the mechanism of cinema, Deleuze substitutes the idea of cinematic 
movement as constructed via the succession of still photographs with the broader concept of movement-
image. The main statement of Deleuze can be summarised as follows: objects that we see on the cinematic 
screen are not merely figures represented in motion. Instead, the very continuity of movement constructs the 
objects and figures, and by this, creates a new thinking of the world. For this reason, he continues, in the 
context of philosophy, cinema is able to produce a new mode of knowledge, and therefore, can expand the 
link between man and the world by creating a new temporality of being in the world (Deleuze 1997b.). 
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intuition as a necessary method of cognition of the world. 
Film camera therefore acts akin to the human mind and captures the world via the
process of intellectual recognition. In other words, the camera isolates the fragments of reality
and erases all subtle differences of the universal movement between frames. To some extent,
this can equally be applied to the mechanism of video camera. At the same time however, I
argue, because of the signaletic features of video, the latter is able to register movement if not
in its incomprehensible totality, then in its pure instantaneity. By any means, video is capable
of interpreting the mechanism of the movement as it  is conceived by Bergson, yet it  also
expands the  nature  of  the  movement,  and in  doing so,  makes  the  latter  eventually  more
accessible to us. 
First and the most obvious difference is that unlike film which operates at only 24
frames per second rate, video in general creates 25/3030 interlaced frames that are  scanned
each second. More specifically,  this means that video consists  of two  sets of half  images
scanned 25/30 times per second, and by extension, bears the quality of 50/60 half frames
(Bensinger 1981). Therefore, it can capture the detailes of movement which the intellect (and
following Bergson, film camera) mostly disregards. 
Second, the omnipresence of video image and the absence of any locale whatsoever
(for  instance,  in  contrast  to  the  cinematic  stripe  or  a  negative  in  photography)  makes  it
impossible  to  construct  a  set  of  separated  frames  and  then  assemble  them  in  the  single
movement on the screen. Instead of a mechanical reconstruction therefore, video acts upon the
world and interacts with matter moulding it in the visible forms. 
Finally, real-time mode of broadcasting video and/or altering it through processing or
even more, creating it from the scratch via synthesis, all together demonstrate the pervasive
possibilities of video in art as opposed to the operation of the intellect in Bergson.  For this
reason, I suggest, the camera-mind analogy is not sufficient for video (both as a technological
and artistic medium). Instead, I propose to think of a video camera, the direct extension of the
video  medium and  the  translator  of  light  into  video  signals,  by  way  of  intuition.  More
specifically, I think, a video camera equally embodies the precise operations of the mind (or
the intellect) and the vague responsiveness of intuition. In doing so, it blends them together
revealing a new possibility to experience the animated world in its intensity, materiality and
30 30 frames per second define NTSC standard which is used primarily in the USA, Canada and Japan, and 25 
frames per second define PAL and SECAM standards which is used in other countries. 
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genuine inconsistency31.
All these three significant features of video find its embodiment in the works of the
'image technicians'. Thus, Nam June Paik's “9/23/69: Experiment with David Atwood” (1969,
USA),  a  series  of  video  experiments  with  the  electromagnetic  manipulation  of  existing
television  material  in  real  time,  demonstrates  the  process  of  transformation  of  a  habitual
image back into the abstract electromagnetic energy, and in doing so, exposes the elasticity
and active potentiality of a video medium  (ill.  1). In this explicitly electronic work, Paik
creatively dissects 'live' televisual images, prerecorded footages and real-time video produced
directly in the studio in order to create a free-form collage composed from the expressionistic
video stream. In the process of exhibiting the work, the image outputted on the screen falls
apart  thereby  suggesting  the  continuity  of  movement  and  revealing  its  undetermined
spontaneity. By manipulating with video flow, Paik destabilises habitual shapes and human
figures in such a way that they can be 'recognised' only by means of purposeful efforts of the
mind.  The  latter,  in  the  imprinted attempts to translate  the  movements on the screen  and
reconstruct the 'reality', selects familiar pieces and tries to reassemble them into a habitual
image.  In  my  opinion,  the  footages  taken  from  television,  in  particular  underline  this
adaptational  resemblance  performed  by  the  mind,  because  television,  due  to  its  social
directness, can offer and sustain one of the most unified and standardised images of the world.
In this regard, Paik's work can indirectly demonstrate how the operations of the mind which
are primarily based on habits can beneficially be enhanced by the 'intuitive'  spontaneity of
video as an artistic medium and, by extension, can also induce the chance to experience the
immediate inconsistency of the world. 
Likewise, Steina Vasulka's “Distant Activities” (1972, USA), a video work created in
real time from a processed video feedback, surpasses the capacity of the mind to withdraw
from matter meaningful movements, and evokes a sort of delusional state in which reality
cannot be assembled in habitual image  (ill.  2). By processing video signal generated by a
feedback setup, Steina creates an electronic video abstraction that consists of a deformed,
almost animated mass of video flow able to change its form, colour and even structure. Not
31 Certainly, film scholars could imply the same in reference to cinema and suggest that the latter combines both 
the mind and intuition inasmuch as video does so. However, I argue, on mechanical level, traditional cinema 
is more closer to the simulation of the movement than video. As I attempt to explain, because of the 
signaletic features, video is more flexible, malleable, and transformable than cinema.  
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only  does  Steina's  video  work  expose  the  malleability  and  plasticity  of  video  as  an  art
medium, but it also implies the existence of another form of life – life that is hidden in the
frequency of light, in the modulation of signal. As a result, this work alters habitual movement
in  the  same  fashion  as  Paik's  “9/23/69:  Experiment  with  David  Atwood”,  and  akin  to
deliriums and altered states, reveals an 'extra information' from matter. 
Remarkable that  Deleuze and Bergson make an emphasis on delirium – a  state of
mind which disrupts the stability of conscious perception.  In most general understanding,
delirium is closely related to such conditions as fever, isolation, alcohol poisoning, vertigo, or
being under the influence of drugs. Video in this regard creates the similar state in which the
experience of reality and illusion overlap in conscious memory. In the process of delirium,
according to Deleuze, our ego is diminished, yet our consciousness is still able to operate, and
therefore, something that we actually see, might be the fragments of pure memory with its
power to cross “the universe in an instant” (Deleuze et al 1994: 201). 
On the one hand, video is indeed can be called intelligent in the sense that it  can
discern particles of light from the universe and translate them into a visible video stream.
From such a perspective, it certainly reflects the intellectual work which, following Bergson,
is based on the process of  taking “one and the same idea” and leading it through “different
planes of consciousness, in a direction which goes from the abstract to the concrete, from the
scheme to the image” (Bergson 1975: 214). On the other hand, I argue, video surpasses the
possibilities of the mind bound to the tendency to draw the precise and rational connections. If
we assume the intellectual work to be a filter that discerns 'useful' information and disregards
all 'insignificant' nuances, then video is seen as capable to register these subtle differences,
and  in  doing  so,  it  triggers  the  broader  diapason  of  pure  memory  with  its  probable
actualisation in conscious memory which, in Bergsonian understanding, embodies a virtual
potential of the past. 
According  to  Deleuze,  our  senses  are  limited  by  a  special  screen  that  acts  as  a
multileveled filter and protects us from being exposed to a pure perception and devoured by
the chaos of images. This filter can be imagined as a kind of mediator, through which the sum
of all  possibilities goes by being sifted via differential  relations. In the process of such a
filtering the world obtains clearness and becomes graspable for conscious perception. Due to
the  refinement,  Deleuze  explains,  perception  gradually  moves  from  virtual  chaos  “into
51
clarity”  (Deleuze  1993: 90).  Analog  video,  therefore,  because  of  its  abilities  to  capture
electromagnetic  waves,  gives  us  the  very  possibility  to  get  closer  to  something  that  lies
beyond, and if  not to lower perceptual threshold, then at  least let us to acknowledge this
threshold and appreciate the 'imaginary' of the world. In a way similarly to pure perception in
Bergson's theory, it can be said that video has a certain potentiality to access the 'aggregate' of
simultaneously present 'images' of matter (Lazzarato 2007). At the same time though, because
of the filters present in the camera, video actualises those virtual possibilities of pure memory
which can be collected in accordance with the sensual threshold of video. In addition to this,
we filter the video image in the same way as we filter reality. However, since the sense of
reality is pre-given to the medium of video which, as it was suggested, is capable to grasp
matter without its prior reconstruction into a set of discrete movements, in my opinion, video
can surpass the intellectual activity and disrupt the stability of conscious perception.
4.2. Non-Representational Medium
It was stated in the introduction into the history of video art that analog video as both art and
technology is essentially a signaletic medium. This means that it consists of electronic signals
which can purposefully or accidentally be assembled into an image. 
One of the most obvious consequences of a signaletic medium is its plasticity and
manoeuvrability.  Like  an  every  electronic  signal,  analog  video  is  transformative  and
multidimensional, it can traverse its signals simultaneously into different directions. For most
of the video artist, this feature of the video medium was the main magnet that drew their
attention and induced new experiments. Thus, reflecting on the artistic potentiality of analog
video, Youngblood describes it as an elastic medium. (Youngblood 1970). For him, video is
expanded  cinema,  “like  life  it's  a  process  of  becoming”,  constantly  in  movement,
transformation and change (Ibid.: 41). Woody Vasulka recalls that there is “a certain behavior
of the electronic image that is  unique .  .  .  .  It's  liquid,  it's  shapeable,  it's  clay,  it's  an art
material, it exists independently” (Vasulka quoted in Video Art Review 1981). Stephen Beck
interprets the malleability of video through the inherent capacity of the medium to go “beyond
a  strictly  photographic/realistic,  representational  aspect  ...”  (Beck  1976:  184).  For  Beck,
therefore, video is a non-representational medium that can go beyond the conventionality of
photography, cinema and television.
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Indeed, video does not consist of a set  of coherent images but simulates an image
through  the  manipulation  of  the  electronic  wave.  In  its  plasticity  it  escapes  all  sorts  of
fixations on the screen and in the camera: neither in the scanning process inside the camera,
nor  on  the  surface  of  the  screen  can  a  'coherent  image'  be  found  (Spielmann  2010).  In
addition, Spielmann adds, video can also exist without the fixation of electronic imagery on
magnetic tape. The real-time visual effects that are generated by means of video processing
can directly be displayed on the screen. In this context, the screen becomes a locus of a video
creation – the point where electronic signals are being assembled into the image and presented
before the eyes of viewers.  
Likewise, by assuming that everything that we perceive consists of images,  Bergson
shows that our knowledge of things takes place only within the things it represents.  I have
mentioned earlier  that  Bergson thinks of matter  as a  set  of images  – an  existence placed
halfway between the “thing” and the “representation” (Bergson 1911: 14). For this reason, it
can be said that representation is always in the image virtually. In other words, in the theory of
Bergson, representation is conceived as a combination of the evolutionary survival inherent in
our  bodies (sensori-motor)  and the  operations of  our  mind based on a  kind  of  conscious
filtering  of  reality.  However,  unlike  other  theories  of  representation  which  assume  the
independent existence of the physical world and the mind, Bergson claims that both the mind
and  the  world  unfold  in  the  same  realm  of  duration,  via  continuous  action  of  memory.
Moreover, the body and the mind, as two reactive images, are already the representations of
matter  and  in  turn  the  products  of  an  active  'intelligent'  recognition  of  consciousness.
Eventually, all the different images matter is 'made of' do not stand for a kind of a signifying
element  that  is  meant  to  represent  the  world,  but  constitute  something akin to  a  genetic
element of the physical world (Lazzarato 2007). 
In this context, it is also remarkable that for Bergson, the form of art best suited for
representation  (he  calls  the  representation  in  art  'imitation')  is  painting  (Bergson  2007).
Similarly, as it was shown, he despises cinema as a spatial simulation of reality and projects
the cinematic mechanism on the work of the intellect. But in video art, neither imitation, nor
simulation takes place. Instead, the medium of video due to its malleability is much closer to
duration than to the spatial simulation. Embodying the temporality of time, video as an artistic
medium is non-representational like Bergsonian duration: “as soon as we try to measure it, we
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unwittingly replace it by space” (Bergson 1910: 106). 
Such a  deception  of  representation  is  analysed  by Dan Sandin  in  the  video work
“Triangle  in  Front  of  Square  in  Front  of  Circle  in  Front  of  Triangle”  (1973,  USA).  By
programming  an  analog  image  processor  in  such  a  way  that  it  visually  executes  logic
equations with simple geometrical forms (triangle, square and circle), Sandin demonstrates
the  artificiality  of  our  concepts of  space  and exposes  the  inability  of  human language to
describe what actually can happen on the video screen (ill. 3). In doing so, he illustrates how
the spatial relations given by video diverge from the logic of perspective on one hand, and
transgresses perception of space experienced in 'reality', on the other. More specifically, in this
work, Sandin forms a spatial line of three simple geometrical figures – triangle, square and
circle  – and then,  by processing the generated video, manually changes their  location by
dragging the figures left and right on the plain surface. At first glance, everything is working
according to a spatial logic and in synch with the laws of perspective: a triangle is located in
front of a square and a square is placed in front of a circle. By extension, based on spatial
representation we can conclude that the triangle must be also located in front of the circle
since the latter is placed on the very background. However, when Sandin drags the circle from
its initial position to the left in the direction of the triangle, the circle turns to be in front of the
triangle and thus on the foreground. Eventually, such a displacement goes against all spatial
relations we employ to make sense of the world. In this process, because of its plasticity,
video  as  an  artistic  medium  resists  the  representational  restrains  and  escapes  any  firm
depiction  of  'reality'.  Instead,  it  invites  into  its  own electronic  'reality'  made  of  constant
transformation, de-assemblage and re-assemblage.
At  the  level  of  technology,  non-representational  plasticity  endows  video  with  a
potential to mutate into sound signals and otherwise, thereby making the former genuinely an
audiovisual medium (Spielmann 2010).  Audiovisuality of every particular  medium can be
understood in many different ways. With analog video, however, it  directly presupposes a
physical feature of the latter to generate sound from the electromagnetic wave and create a
visual output from the acoustic wave. While describing the nature of electronic systems, Bill
Viola suggests that in such systems, “the same electronic signal can be an image if fed into a
video monitor, an energy diagram if fed into an oscilloscope, and a sequence of sounds if fed
into an audio system” (Viola 2003 [1982]: 468). 
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In this regard, there exists an extensive number of video works in which artists have
attempted to investigate this kind of reciprocal change of sound and video easily achieved
with analog signal. For instance, the emblematic experiments in this direction are done by
Stephen Beck with his series of live performances “Illuminated Music” (1972-1973, USA). In
one of such performances from the series created together with a musician Warner Jepson,
Beck  synthesised  sound waves  into  video  signal  and otherwise  (ill.  4).  Electronic  sound
produced by Jepson was fed into the Direct Video Synthesizer which Beck designed himself
and altered into a video image. As a result, the latter was composed in real time without the
use of any camera image. Interestingly, Beck called this sort of audiovisual composition a
form  of  “visual  jazz”  because,  though  the  visual  themes  and  variations  varied  in  each
interpretation, the basic visual structure of the work remained the same from performance to
performance32. In this sense, the flexibility of  sound and video signals does not necessarily
mean the lack of control. Instead, it signifies the very fragility of representation in video art,
its plastic instability, relative independency and evident mutability. 
Very much alike experiments meant to study the inherent in video audiovisuality were
done by Steina Vasulka who by being initially educated as a professional violinist was able to
appreciate a special visual 'musicality' of the analog signal. Her work “Violin Power” (1978,
USA)  is  composed  from  the  direct  alteration  of  video  and  audio  signals  in  real-time
performance (ill. 5). By processing the live sound of violin through the Scan Processor and
additionally  altering it  with a keyer and the Frequency Shifter,  Steina used  the emanated
sound output for the modification of the real-time video. This video, in turn, was generated by
two cameras which recorded Steina performing a musical piece, and at the same time, by
means of the Scan Processor which altered the output image before it was displayed on a
screen.  Such a sophisticated setup has eventually generated the effect in which the bow of
violin  meddled with the video signal and twisted the output image. To some extent, in this
work, the violin becomes the tool able to generate the image and alter it via the incoming
sound. Similarly to Beck who referred to his “Illuminated Music” performances as a kind of
“visual jazz”, Steina labeled “Violin Power” “a demo tape on how to play video on the violin”
(Spielmann 2004: 26). In this vein, these two works of Stephen Beck and Steina Vasulka stand
as  an  eloquent  demonstration  of  the  relationship  of  music  (both  electronic  and live)  and
32 The description of other works in this series can be found on Beck's web-site http://www.stevebeck.tv/ill.htm
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electronic  image  manifesting  the  unique  transformative,  mutually  changeable  and  non-
representation nature of the signaletic medium of video. 
Finally,  the  omnipresence  of  the  electronic  signals  complements  the  non-
representational characteristics of video.  On top of that,  the image comes as the versatile
outcome of the electrical assemblage, which in many cases is difficult to manage with high
precision. To some extent, this unpredictability of video eventually determined the methods of
working with the medium in arts. In contrast to the exactness, accuracy and attention to the
image's  quality of the artists working with photography and film, video artists were more
open to the  volatility  and instability  of  video33.  Rather  than trying to  control  video,  they
established a dialogical connection in order to investigate into the signaletic nature of the new
artistic medium. It is especially remarkable in the all above mentioned experiments in which
the video image is only accidental and does not represent the final goal of the manipulations
with video. 
As I  attempted to  show, the theory of Bergson allows us to look at  the notion of
representation from a different angle, assuming that the 'real' and the 'visible' emanate from
the continuous actions of memory, in other words, they are the products of duration. Likewise,
video  due  to  continuous  transformations  that  take  place  inside  the  camera,  escapes
representation and shapes video images by means of the constant alteration of the electronic
wave.  Because  of  this,  it  can  be  said  that  both  video  and  memory  share  certain  non-
representational features and merely assemble and reassemble matter at every next moment of
time.  In  fact,  the  ramifications  of  Bergsonian  approach  towards  representation  are  much
broader, and therefore, in the following, I will be going back to this idea in the contexts of
continuous  modulation  of  electronic  signal,  Deleuze's  concept  of  diagram,  problematic
questions of reflexiveness and indexicality of video. 
4.3. Materialisation of Video as Actualisation of Memory
The foregoing idea that  video art avoids representation in the same fashion as memory in
33 In both conventional film and analog photography, the exactness and directly connected to it craftsmanship 
play a very important role. On one hand, it is determined by the technical characteristics of these media 
which, in order to produce the final image, must undertake a set of procedures such as development of the 
initial material, printing, and editing. On the other, some of the aesthetic features of both film and 
photography are connected to the hight quality of the images (sharpness of the image, correct exposure, 
carefully thought out composition). 
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Bergson encourages me to inquire into the process of materialisation of video with respect to
the mechanism of actualisation of memory as it is described by Bergson. In order to do so, I
need to look inside a video camera and to analyse what happens to the analog signal after it is
captured by the camera. 
Video signal, a basic element of every video, is generated when the light particles are
scanned by a sensitive surface inside the camera, or by any other alternative hardware able to
convert  electromagnetic  energy  of  light  into  electrical  energy  of  video  signal.  After
acquisition, video signals can further be modified, transmitted, saved in the form of an image
on the tape or projected on the screen of a monitor. In general terms, the mechanism of video
materialisation can schematically be represented as follows:
Fig. 2: The Process of Materialisation of Video
The electromagnetic energy of light that is captured by the camera (A) goes through
the lens (B) towards the surface of the vidicon (C). Inside of the vidicon, the patterns of light
and dark are scanned by the  electron beam (D) and converted into electrical information or
voltage that can be output in a number of ways (E).
Due to the specificity  of video conversion,  in analog video,  the encoded signal  is
continuous with respect to time and the values of represented information. It is translated into
electric pulses of varying amplitude and denoted by physical measurements. In digital video,
in contrast, the signal is discontinuous in time, generated as a result of digital modulation and
represents encoded information by means of  binary format (zero or one) in which each bit
stands for two distinct amplitudes (Parker 2010). Whereas it can be assumed that analog video
records waveforms as they are in their original state, digital video samples them into a limited
set of numbers. It derives from this kind of difference that in spite of translation, the analog
still entails the physical measurements of light, while the digital is stripped off any physical
connection with light particles. Such a conclusion in turn constitutes the basis for the complex
discussion on the indexicality of video, which is additionally scrutinised in this paper. 
When considered in  reverse,  the  mechanism of  video described above,  I  argue,  is
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analogical to the mechanism of memory explicated in the Chapter 3. By reverse order I mean
the  inverse  line  'present-past'.  Traditionally,  we  accustomed  to  think  of  video  camera  as
capturing the present  in  order  to carry it  into the  future thus creating from the present  a
'recorded' moment of the past. However, I offer to look at the camera in synch with Bergson's
idea of the past moving into the present, and therefore propose to approach light that travels
into the camera metaphorically as 'the universe out there', or following Bergson, the past, or
even better, pure memory. 
When captured by the camera,  photons travel  onto the sensitive surface inside the
camera  (vidicon in  analog and matrix  in  digital)  where  electromagnetic  energy is  further
translated into electronic signals. As it follows, the process of 'materialization' of video image
is based on first, the continuous motion of light particles, second, their translation into the
signal, and third, is sustained by the constant movement and modulation of the signal. In the
camera, the signal is endlessly scanned into scan lines from which video image is eventually
made. Since the signal of video  comes as a wide range of the electromagnetic spectrum –
from visible light and infrared to gamma rays and beyond, – our eyes, which have a certain
bandwidth, allow us to see only visible spectrum of light. Such a limited bandwidth, after all,
prevents us from being overwhelmed with the pure perception of the universe on one hand,
and determines our survival by actualizing the exact amount of the past experience needed to
sustain the present. At this point, it is important to highlight one more time that, according to
Bergson, in the process of recollection, we do not move from the present to the past, or from
perception to recollection, but quite the opposite. We progress from the past into the present,
starting from recollection and proceeding to perception (Deleuze, 1991). 
Deleuze explains the process of the actualisation of memory through the mechanism
by  which  pure  memory  takes  on  its  psychological  existence  thus  materialising  itself  in
conscience  memory.  In  doing  so,  he  discerns  four  aspects  of  actualisation:  translation,
rotation,  dynamic  movement  and  mechanical  movement  (Ibid.).  Translation,  according  to
Deleuze's reading of Bergson, expresses the ontological difference between the virtual levels
and regions of the past (here translation works as an intensity of contraction that indicates the
difference between two layers of the past), and also embodies a movement that is necessary
for the actualisation of the past experience taken from a particular level in the past. 
Rotation is the process that secures translation thereby determining the transition of
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the  past  into  the present. It  is  carried out  by memory in  order  to  unite  translation to  the
present. In translation, according to Deleuze, the whole level of the past is actualised in the
same way as a particular memory (he calls it “undivided representation”):
But how do we become conscious of it, how do we distinguish it in the region that is actualized with it?
We begin from this undivided representation (that Bergson will call "dynamic scheme"), where all the
recollections in  the  process  of  actualization are  in  a  relationship of  reciprocal  penetration;  and we
develop  it  in  distinct  images  that  are  external  to  one  another,  that  correspond  to  a  particular
recollection” (Deleuze 1991: 66).
It is the task of rotation, therefore, to materialise a particular memory in the image and discern
it  from the  general  past  within which  the  image  is  recalled.  In  other  words,  recollection
prepares the ground for  memory to  be perceived again  and thus be again recalled in the
present moment. These two processes – translation and rotation – take place simultaneously,
in  order  to  form “the  properly  psychic  moments”  (Ibid.:  70).  In  contrast,  two remaining
processes – dynamic and mechanical movements – depend on the attitudes of the bodies and
sensori-motor features. More specifically, dynamic movement is the attitude of the body that
determines and sustains the stability of translation and rotation. Mechanical movement is an
automatic recognition that takes place on the level of perception, and thus, it represents the
very  final  stage  of  the  actualisation.  Similarly  to  translation  and  rotation,  dynamic  and
mechanical movements are executed synchronously in order to evoke attentive recognition.
These four stages, Deleuze concludes, eventually embody “the adaptation of the past to the
present,  the utilization of the past in terms of the present  – something that Bergson calls
“attention to life” (Ibid.). 
As I suggest, this elaborate four-stage process of actualisation of pure memory into
conscience memory can be projected on the mechanism of materialisation of video images. In
general terms, similarly to memory that should be actualised in the present perception, video
must also be embodied in the image. Previously, I have stressed that for Bergson, the process
of recollection functions in reverse order – moving from the past into the present, from pure
memory into present perception. In this regard, translation in Deleuze expresses the particles
of light which travel from the distant layers of the past into the nearest past – the present34–
and, by doing so, transfer memory (in its materiality, as it is understood by Bergson) towards
the present moment in order to find the points of connection with it. Rotation, in turn, can be
34 Keeping in mind that in Bergson, the present moment is already in the past, I can specify it as a 'present-past' 
or one of the closest layers of the past. 
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abstracted to the complementary to translation moment when light, after being captured by the
camera, is further actualised on the surface of vidicon by being decoded into the video signal.
In  this  process,  a  sensitive  surface  of  the  camera  also  acts  akin  to  both  dynamic  and
mechanical  movements:  on  one  hand,  it  reacts  on  the  light  flickers  thereby ensuring  the
harmony  of  the  two  preceding  moments,  and  on  the  other,  it  also  mechanically  scans
translated signals into scan lines of video. In general, the above mentioned analogy can be
schematised as follows: 
Fig. 3: Actualisation of Memory as Materialisation of Video
In the scheme, P1, P2, P3 and P4 are the layers of the past in which P4 is the nearest.
R and D/M stand for rotation, dynamic and mechanical movements. 
Noteworthy,  for  Deleuze,  all  these  four  stages  are  essential  in  oder  to  bring  the
memory of the past in the present. In case of missing rotation, for instance, one particular
memory cannot be discerned from the whole chunk of the past it belongs to. In case rotation
occurs and  distinct images of the past are formed without prior translation, they would be
detached from the whole of memory. By the same token, video cannot come into being if it
by-passes  one  of  the  stages  of  its  formation:  if  light  neglects  vidicon or  signals  sidestep
scanner,  the  result  will  output  only  noise  which  in  some  cases  could  probably  be  even
ungraspable by human senses. In my opinion, such an analogy simplifies the understanding of
both the processes of materialisation of video and actualisation of memory. However, I want
to add that the description offered above is incomplete. More precisely, in both cases, it lacks
a very final yet  probably the most  important  so-called 'fifth'  element.  In case of memory
actualisation, the missing element is a kind of a new presence that 'animates' memory making
it finally embodied in perception. In case of video materialisation, the lacking element is an
artist who endows video with a sort of special 'liveness' making it indeed an affective and
vibrant work of art. These two elements are analysed in more detail in following chapters,
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when I finally come closer to the role of an artist in the process of making video art.
4.4. Duration as Temporality and Modulation of Video
Taking into account the above mentioned signaletic features of video and bearing in mind the
analogical  connections  in  both  mechanisms  of  memory  and  video,  it  is  now possible  to
descent  to  the  details.  First,  and,  in  my  opinion,  the  most  obvious  would  be  to  project
Bergsonian  duration  of  memory onto  the  temporality  of  video that  was  an  essential  and
explicit component of early video art. 
According to Deleuze, Bergson assumes the existence of a multiplicity of durations at
the same time suggesting that all these durations unfold in the unified duration – “a single
livable and lived time” (Deleuze 1991: 84). The artistic medium of video, by the same token,
introduces this total duration expressed in the continuous movement of light on one pole, and
also creates its own individual duration via the specific temporality inherent in this medium.
This latter duration of video can be the one that particularly correlates with a psychological
duration to which Bergson refers when he talks about human duration. Human duration, or
“the duration of the spectator”, is both “a flux of Time” and “the representation of Time” in
which “all fluxes are engulfed” (Ibid.: 82). Hence the presence of a unified Time and the
multiplicity of actual fluxes or temporalities35. Deleuze highlights that for a man coming to
existence already in the human condition of a high degree of relaxation it is very difficult to
understand  the  meaning  of  “creation”  –  the  essential  notion  for  every  artistic  formation
(Ansell  Pearson  2007).  Trying  to  comprehend  the  movement  of  time,  early  video  artists
approached the latter as a special material – the object of their artistic investigations and the
field for their ambitious experiments. In these experiments, time was extended, contracted,
rewinded, delayed and encapsulated into a variety of repeated and reorganised loops. Since
feedback or 'closed circuit' will be inspected in the Chapter 4.6, in this paragraph, I want to
analyse the mechanism of looping in more detail. 
Looping is one of the most popular techniques of working with video used equally by
artists  on the early stage of video development  and later,  with the proliferation of digital
video. However, whereas in contemporary practice loop has become a key exhibition device,
35 In order to clarify Bergson at this point, Deleuze turns to the theory of Relativity and explains that Einstein's 
relativity expresses the symbolic factor of time and not time as something lived or experienced. (Deleuze's 
detailed explanation can be found in Bergsonism 1991, pp. 82-85)
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in the early experiments the looping technique was incorporated as a “genuine part of the
temporality of the work” (Ross 2006: 98). Video loop is the potentially endless repetition of a
one sequence which can either be performed in real-time, or pre-recorded on the tape and then
repeated in circle motion. In Bergson's ontology, the notion of repetition is the cornerstone of
evolution of life. It is aligned to matter and opposed to contraction which defines duration:
“repetition is the mode of a present that appears only when the other present has disappeared
— the present  itself,  or exteriority,  vibration,  relaxation” (Deleuze 1991: 45).  In contrast,
duration, because of its capacity to create difference, disrupts the condition for repetition to
happen. At the same time, both repetition and difference are the essential components of life
and, by the same token, the necessary parts of memory. Thus, a habit-memory with inherent in
it automatism, is entirely based on repetition. The sensori-motor mechanism conserves the
discontinuous past in the body by means of automatic recognition. Since memory consists of
both elements of repetition and contraction, it has the ability to multiply itself and maintain
itself. As Deleuze explains, the “identical elements of material repetition blend together in a
contraction”, and the contraction “presents both something new, i.e. difference, and degrees
which are the degrees of this difference itself”. In this sense, he concludes, “difference is still
a repetition” (Ibid.: 47). 
On one hand, video is a mode of technology that is based on the repetitive movement
of signals which travel back and forth through the surface of vidicon. On the other, in the
process of such a movement, signal changes itself, and akin to Bergson's duration, alters its
own nature. Loop therefore is the materialized amplification of this action – the metaphor of
difference that, according to Deleuze, is still a repetition. Furthermore, similar to memory that
coexists in the present with that which it recalls, looped video, likewise, embodies the certain
past that is invoked in the present moment.  In this very embodiment, video simulates our
psychological duration: it actualises virtual possibilities of light to create images and thus
evokes memory which becomes complete when we perceive the video image. Because of the
immateriality of signals, it can be suggested that video as both technology and an art medium
is more capable of contracting than our consciousness. At the same time, due to the repetitive
motion,  it  also shares a high degree of relaxation,  and because of this, it  can materialise
images of matter. 
Whereas video loop is the projection of human duration, the energy of light is the
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analogy of a unified duration in which all other durations coexist and are represented together.
It was already outlined that modulation36 of light is at the kernel of transmission of video
signals. In the context of video art, light is a flow of energy which on one hand, brings video
into being (because video is made of light), and on the other, makes it happen on the screen
(because light is needed to reflect the output energy). In turn, duration, as it was explicated in
the previous chapter, is memory, or following Deleuze's precision, “the coexistence of degrees
of difference” (Deleuze 2004 [1956]: 39). And it is exactly the conscience memory of the past
that actualises the latter in the present via continuous duration. 
For this reason, if seen from the perspective of duration, electromagnetic energy of
light becomes indeed the carrier of information preserved in matter in which the moments of
time exist outside each other in an un-synthesized manner. The whole universe is shaped from
“modifications, disturbances, changes of tension and of energy, and nothing else” (Deleuze
1991: 76). At the level of video transmission, this process is described via the modulation of
electromagnetic radiation, both visible and invisible. Contemplating on the potentialities of
video for creation, Bill Viola suggests that just like in Indian and some Asian religions the
origin  of  the world is  grounded in sound, video is  a  filed of  “living  dynamic energy”,  a
vibration of moving electrons. In fact, he concludes, video is just of one of many potential
effects of frequency modulation (Viola 1998 [1986]: 158). 
As a  thinker of flows and intensities,  Deleuze conceptualises modulation in various
ways. In this work, I departure from his definition of signaletic material, since it is directly
connected to my analysis on one hand, and contributes to the discussion on the indexicality of
analog video, on the other. As it was stated, video is inherently a signaletic medium, and this
in turn determines its transformative nature. For Deleuze,  signaletic  material  “includes all
kinds  of  modulation  features,  sensory  (visual  and  sound),  kinetic,  intensive,  affective,
rhythmic, tonal, and even verbal (oral and written)” (Deleuze 1997b.: 29). However, as he
continues in the same passage, this is “neither a language system nor a language”. For him,
signaletic material can be articulated through the modulation of flows, when a “plastic mass”
expresses a whole which changes itself through the process of differentiation. The question of
language is of high importance to Deleuze, since he thinks of signaletic as “a-signifying and
36 In electrical engineering, modulation is defined as the process of taking information bits and mapping them 
to symbols (Parker 2010: 81). In this work, however, I rely on the definition of Deleuze in which modulation 
is conceived by means of various modifications, disturbances and changes of tension and energy (1991).
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a-syntaxic material”  that  is  not  formed linguistically.  In  fact,  diverging from Bergson,  he
proposes  to  think  of  cinema  by  means  of  flows,  intensities  and  modulations  of  such  a
signaletic material37. Although the medium analysed in this paper is video (and previously it
has been suggested that cinema and video are two distinct media), the signaletic features of
cinema advocated by Deleuze in relation to cinema can, I argue, be also projected on video in
both technological and artistic senses. 
First, video in its plasticity is not formed linguistically but created from the 'light of
the  day'  –  from the  modulations  of  electromagnetic  energy captured  and processed  by a
camera or other similar device. Second, video can be shaped and re-shaped with respect to its
form and content, yet it is not a pure abstraction to the extend that it nevertheless bears the
physicality of analog signal. Finally, in video, modulations highlights its 'unutterability'. This
implies that video is by any means beyond representation through language: it can neither be
sufficiently  described,  nor  accurately  expressed  via  language.  And  here  once  again  we
encounter  the  non-representational  capacities  of  video  as  an  artistic  medium.  Since
modulation  is  a  process  of  transformation  at  every  single  moment,  it  is  deprived  of  the
representational  stability.  More  specifically,  for  Deleuze  it  is  the  “operation  of  the  Real”
because it “never stops reconstituting the identity of image and object” (Ibid.: 28). “The video
image is a standing wave pattern of electrical energy, a vibrating system composed of specific
frequencies …”, writes Bill Viola, and concludes that the “vibrational acoustic character of
video as a virtual image is the essence of its “liveness” (Viola 1998 [1986]: 158).
This idea that video images were nothing more than electromagnetic energy of light
unfolding in time was central for Woody Vasulka. His video work “The Matter” (1974, USA)
37 Hence his disagreement with Christian Metz and Umberto Eco who, in his opinion, strived to assimilate the 
cinematographic image to an utterance: “The root of the difficulty is the assimilation of the cinematographic 
image to an utterance. From that point on, this narrative utterance necessarily operates through resemblance 
or analogy, and, in as much as it proceeds through signs, these are 'analogical signs'. Semiology thus needs to 
have a double transformation: on the one hand the reduction of the image to an analogical sign belonging to 
an utterance; on the other hand, the codification of these signs in order to discover the (non-analogical) 
linguistic structure underlying these utterances. Everything will take place between the utterance by analogy, 
and the 'digital' or digitalized structure of the utterance.” (1997b.: 27). The problem of such an assimilation, 
according to Deleuze, is that once it is made, the movement – or differentiation – is by definition taken away 
from the image. As a result, relying on linguistics in the attempt to decipher cinema, we are at once deprived 
from the potentiality of cinematic medium to manifest the modulation of the movement and endow the 
cinematic image with a “false appearance” (Ibid.). What is more, without movement, following Bergson, 
everything becomes matter, and the distinction between image and object is vanished. For Deleuze, semiotics 
is “the system of images and signs independent of language in general” (Ibid.: 29). The greatest oblivion for 
him is to analyse cinema though the narrative. This is exactly the point reiterated by Deleuze in his attempt to 
read cinema as a signaletic material. 
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is  created  from  different  waveforms  (sine,  triangle,  and  square  waves)  produced  by  the
waveform generator and modulated by the Rutt/Etra processes. Because of such a complex
alteration, the waveforms that emerge on the screen create the illusion of three-dimensionality
thereby demonstrating the variability of time and energy in video (ill. 6). As a result, one can
witness how a plain surface of grey matter highlighted by the blue background is constantly
changing its form and shape thereby creating a kind of visual modulation on the screen. Even
though various waveforms are being shaped into something that can from time to time remind
us a certain geometric figure or a building block, it still hinders representation from evolving
into  something  at  least  slightly  coherent.  Once  we  have  established  the  relations  of
resemblance with something that  looks familiar  as, for instance,  a rectangular prism, grey
matter has reshaped itself and has shrunk into something different, as for example, a zigzag or
a  serpentine  shape.  Eventually,  as  it  derives  from such an  alteration,  representation  slips
through our fingers implying the 'unutterability' of modulated signal, its tendency to expand
outside the boundaries of both representation and the screen. Woody recalls: 
At that time, I was totally obsessed with this idea that there was no single frame anymore. I come
from the movies, where the frame was extremely rigid, and I understood that electronic material
has no limitation within its existence. It only has limitation when it reaches the screen because the
screen itself is a rigid time structure (Vasulka quoted in Gill 1976: 47).
Continuous modulation of electronic signal therefore is the key feature of analog video
and the link that unites video and memory together. At the same time, Spielmann recognises
the apparent connection between the continuous in analog and the discrete values in digital
signals, however for her, this connection exists in the form of the affinity and inheritance,
when the digital inherits the technology of analog video (Spielmann 2010). Developing this
argument, Spielmann writes that analog video shares at once features of the analog and the
digital, and these common properties, in her opinion, derive from the signaletic character of
video. Indeed, similarly to immateriality, non-fixity, and modifiability inherent in the digital,
analog video, likewise, shares the same characteristics: fluidity and non-fixity of electronic
signals, their omnipresence in the camera and in the monitor, immediacy and performativity.
At the same time though,  analog video possesses  individual  and distinct  from the digital
features such as flicker artefacts, low resolution, fuzziness of recording and propagation of the
signal. “Both the signal transmission and the information compiled in the image connote the
fundamental instability of the audiovisual medium”, explains Spielmann (Ibid.: 47). In turn,
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this kind of instability of the video medium endows analog video with a special 'liveness' –
the property that, in my opinion, defines the analog on the first  place,  makes it  indeed a
unique art medium, and also differentiates it from its direct successor – the digital. The latter
point in this discussion finally brings me closer to the question of indexical connection of
video with the physical world on one hand, and opens the debates on the digital/analog, on the
other. 
4.5. Reflexivity and Indexicality of Video Art
The digital-analog debates encompass a  large variety of topics,  questions and approaches
which, because of the limited scope of my research, cannot be thoroughly analysed in this
paper.  The reason,  however,  why I  nevertheless  want  to  touch upon some aspects  of the
digital-analog discussion lies in the question to what extent the model of memory that I build
based on the theory of Bergson can be applicable to digital video/media art and can also be
discussed in the frame of hybrid media. In this context, I think, the difference between analog
and digital video is important, since it helps to enquire into the 'liveness' of video as a magnet
for early video artists and 'image-technicians', in particular. In addition, these debates also
compliment the process of modeling of memory in  Bergsonian theory as a kind of memory
that bears a physical bond with the world. Finally, all together it brings me closer to the role
of an artist in video art, and thus, helps to boost the model of video as an art medium. 
The difference between analog and digital video can be explained from a number of
various angles. In my opinion, in discussing Bergson's  theory,  one of the most rewarding
approaches is to follow the elaborate division between the digital and the analog explicated by
Deleuze. To some extent, the distinction that he draws logically derives from the previous
discussion on modulation.  Thus,  developing the idea of modulation of signaletic  material,
Deleuze brings up to the foreground the question of digital-analog and explains both terms
metaphorically through two modes of mediation: direct material and indirect immaterial. For
him,  it  is  not  suffice  to  draw the  line  between the  analog and the  digital  at  the  level  of
resemblance assigned to the former and “code, convention, and combinations of conventional
units” attributed to the latter (Deleuze 2003: 114). Likewise, it is not enough to think of the
analog by means of a certain immediate presence and the digital as something that should be
learned. Instead, he conceives analogical and digital modes of expression by virtue of their
66
ability to generate sensations. 
More specifically, Deleuze stresses that analogical is “a language of relations, which
consists of expressive movements, paralinguistic signs, breaths and screams [...]” (Ibid.: 113).
To better  illustrate  this  dense  though  ambiguous  argument,  he  brings  up  the  example  of
analogical language in animals and writes that rather than to be found in the 'songs' which
animals  'sing',  analogical  language  is  one  of  animals'  “cries,  variable  colors,  and  lines
(attitudes, postures)” (Ibid.: 114). Digital language, in contrast, is the language of codes and
symbols,  yet  it  can  nevertheless  cover  a  certain  degree  of  analogy:  either  “analogy  by
isomorphism, or analogy by produced resemblance” (Ibid.: 115). What is more, Deleuze also
highlights that even the analog can be stripped off to two different forms. One such a form is
based on figurative resemblance (as for instance, in case of the photograph which captures
relations of light), and the other is a kind of resemblance “through nonresembling means” (as
for instance, in case of the painting). This latter form of the analog is a sensible resemblance,
in  which  “instead  of  being  produced  symbolically,  through  the  detour  of  the  code”,  the
analogy is “produced “sensually,” through sensation” (Ibid.: 115-116). 
In order to expand this discussion, Deleuze evokes the notion of  the diagram which,
for him, is the “agent” of the analog, and stresses that the former acts as a modulator and not
as  a  code  (Ibid.:  120).  In  fact,  according to  Deleuze,  it  is  precisely modulation (and not
resemblance) that makes it possible to inquire into the nature of the analog as a diagram.
Modulation therefore is  an indispensable property of the analog,  a sensible  movement  of
flows,  and a  heterogeneous field of  intensities.  By the same token,  following the  line of
Deleuze, analog video, which is made of continuous modulation of electronic signal, can be
conceptualised as a kind of diagram in which “manual order will have been used to break all
the figurative coordinates” and to liberate “lines for the armature and colors for modulation”
(Ibid.). In other words, Deleuze sidetracks a more traditional point of view on the distinction
between  the  analog  and  the  digital  that  derives  primarily  from  indexical  connection  or
figurative resemblance. It is important to stress, in addition, that Deleuze follows Peirce in his
assumption  that  indexical  relations,  relations  of  resemblance  and  symbolical  connection
cannot be separated from each other and exist in affinity. This is why, I think, the notion of
diagram, which requires that we acknowledge modulation as a constructive force, helps to
understand the nature of analog in arts to  a greater degree.  In this regard,  I  propose that
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Deleuze's analogical diagram as “the operative set of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines
and zones” (Ibid.: 101), if applied to video art, is precisely something akin to the 'liveness' of
video – the vibrating energy of analog video as an artistic medium. But there is more to this.
If going back to the comparison of the mechanism of actualisation of memory in the theory of
Bergson and  the  process  of  materialisation  of  video (Chapter  4.3)  in  which  the  latter  is
encoded into video signal, the important questions remain unsolved. Namely, to what extent it
is possible to think of analog video as an entirely analogical diagram, and to what extent the
language of relations, or analogical language makes video an art medium?
Unfolding Deleuze's  concept  of  diagram in this direction and additionally  evoking
Spielmann's conclusion about the ambivalent status of analog video as something that shares
at once the features of the digital and the analog, I want to propose that the nature of analog
video, because of its simultaneous alliance with technology and art, can better be understood
by means of a paradoxical status of two particular diagrams38 in Deleuze – abstract art and
abstract expressionism. On one hand, the diagram in abstract art is based on a paradoxical
code – something that rather than being opposed to analogy, “takes analogy as its object”. As
Deleuze further clarifies, “it is the digital expression of the analogical as such” (Ibid.: 117).
The paradoxical status of this type of diagram with respect to video implies that being initially
analogical, video, like abstract painting in Deleuze's example, passes through a code rather
than a diagram, and by this, following Deleuze, it obtains a special capacity “that borders on
the impossible” (Ibid.). On the other hand, it can be also said that video shares features of the
second type  of  diagram –  the  diagram of  abstract  expressionism.  In  this  connection,  the
former also borders on impossible akin to the abstract expressionists, by having an ability to
expand the diagram, “take it for the analogical flux itself”, and direct it toward itself, thereby
surpassing any code whatsoever (Ibid.). 
With respect to video art, such a  self-directness or reflexivity of video has been the
38 In discussing the notion of diagram, Deleuze distinguishes three types of it. First, he speaks of the diagram in 
abstract painting and characterises it by optical space, digital code, line with a contour, a special kind of 
tension and an inner infinite vision. Second, he refers to the diagram in abstract expressionism and describes 
it via manual line without contour, totality of the painting, chaos deployed to the maximum and 
decomposition of matter. Finally, he discerns the third type of a diagram – neither optical, nor manual – it is 
characterised by “the precision of sensation, the clarity of the Figures and the rigor of the contour” (Deleuze 
2003: 109). For my argument, however, I use the concept of diagram in more general sense as an asignifying 
and nonrepresentative element. For me, it is more important to understand the paradoxical nature of video art 
by combining all these diagrammatic features together than to inquire in the concept of diagram with high 
precision. 
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predominant topic in the critical analysis of video since its first appearance in the form of an
art medium. Similarly to the digital-analog debates, the issue of reflexivity could be discussed
from a number of different perspectives, and for this reason, in order to draw the connection
with the model of memory based on the theory of Bergson, I focus on two key concepts. More
specifically, the most influential historical accounts on video's reflexivity can be found in the
writings of Rosalind Kraus and Yvonne Spielmann. 
Krauss's essay “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism” (1976) analyses works of those
artists who used a video camera as an alleged mirror39. When interacting with the camera's
feedback in real-time as with the mirrored self, these artists, according to Krauss, exposed the
symptomatic characteristics of video, namely, a state of a narcissistic re-projection in which  
the  body  or  psyche  becomes  self-encapsulated  or  literally  surrounded  by  itself.  In  this
perpetuated continuity of the renewed images of the artists themselves, video brings the sense
of   a  collapsed present.  For  Krauss,  therefore,  such a  form of  a  narcissistic  enclosure  is
inherent in the video-medium, and for this reason, she recognises the reflexive mode of video
in  the  process  of  “consciousness  doubling  back upon itself”  (Krauss  1976:  55).  In  other
words, by highlighting the reflexive features of video, artists aimed at the separation of forms
of art from its contexts but instead, they exposed and critically accounted a vague narcissistic
suppression as a form of “bracketing-out the world and its conditions” (Ibid.: 64).
Unlike Krauss who does not speak of a  physicality of the medium but highlights its
psychological side that starts from the evident resemblance and ends in apparent uncertainty,
Spielmann does quite the opposite. For her, the artistic destabilization of form and context lies
outside  the  question  of  video's  reflexivity.  Instead,  she  brings  to  the  foreground  the
technological  characteristics  of  the  art  medium and  emphasises  the  self-directness  of  the
signal transmission in video art. Thus, the example of Steina Vasulka’s “Orbital Obsessions”
(1977, USA) that Spielmann provides in her book sheds more light on the reflexivity of the
signaletic medium. In the artwork, Vasulka positioned two cameras in such a way that they
face each other creating a closed-circuit of video transmission akin to a surrounding studio
(ill.  7). By altering the image sources through processing,  keying, and sequencing, Steina
multiplies the feedback and interferes the spatial complexity of the initial feedback structure.
39 Krauss centres her argument around the works of Vito Acconci (Centers, 1971; Air Time, 1973), Richard 
Serra and Nancy Holt (Boomerang, 1974), Bruce Nauman (Revolving Upside Down, 1968), Lynda Benglis 
(Now, 1973), Joan Jonas (Vertical Roll, 1972) and Peter Campus (mem and dor, 1974).
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As a result of this process, the reflexiveness is achieved via the  immediate feedback of the
electronically generated images on one hand, and via the interaction of the artist with the
medium, on the other. Spielmann explains that a video image, electronically generated in such
a way, eventually radiates its immediate presence right where the artist (or the viewer) is
located (Spielmann 2010).  By this,  she makes an accent  on the signaletic  features  of  the
medium and its instantaneous responsiveness. In other words, Spielmann explicitly highlights
the  reactive  capacities  of  electronic  signals  and  emphasises  the  continuous  expressive
movement of the flow of the electrons. 
Both above mentioned approaches towards reflexivity of video could be stretched out
onto the mechanism of memory in Bergson in its own manner. Krauss locates video in the
domain of psychic which not only doubts its own existence but also questions the existence of
the  'real',  and  in  doing  so,  she  directly  opposes  Bergson's  views  on  representation  as
something  that unfolds  together  with  consciousness  via  continuous  action  of  memory.
Moreover, her views on video art doubt the continuity of duration in Bergson and suggest the
conservation of the present in psychic. In this regard, the type of reflexivity she speaks of can
be comprehended by means of contra-duration. In contrast to Krauss, Spielmann attempted to
decompose the technical mechanism of the video medium. From this perspective, I suggest,
Spielmann's idea of reflexivity could be aligned to the functional expressivity of memory in
Bergson. More precisely, in Bergson's theory, the capacity of images to act and react on the
external processes in the universe, as well as to be responsive to the internal processes inside
these images, could possibly be projected on the mechanism of video's reflexivity described
by Spielmann. 
Even to the larger extent, however, the expressivity of the images Bergsonian universe
consists of is closely connected to the above mentioned problematic notion of the indexical
relations in video. In suggesting that video is a reflexive medium, Spielmann also touches
upon the representational capacities of video images. However, for her, the representation of
video primarily lies in the physical reference. As she elaborates, whereas in analog video the
physical relations between the images and the content they refer to are preserved, in digital
video these relations are irreversibly severed. At the same time, she also points at the very
ambiguity of the indexical connection in video images. According to Spielmann, because of
the general immateriality and malleability of video, the sharp difference between analog and
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digital inherent in film and photography is blurred. In turn, this intermediate position between
analogue recording and digital simulation is precisely something that makes video a reflexive
medium (Blom 2013). 
In this regard, Blom offers a third definition of video's reflexivity that can be located
in-between Krauss and Spielmann and, at the same time, can also expand the discussion on
video's indexicality explicated in this paper. More specifically, Blom especially emphasises
the capacity of video to act and produce difference.  Making references to the writings of
Lazzarato in which he analyses video from the technological perspective and claims that the
medium of video reproduces the contraction–dilation of time (Lazzarato 2007), Blom draws a
conclusion that video art produces a new way of thinking that spins around a phenomenon of
real  time (Blom 2013).  To some degree,  this  latter  approach is  reminiscent  of  Deleuze's
understanding of the difference between the analogical and the digital modes of expression by
means of their ability to generate sensations. Yet, I think, both Lazzarato and Blom help to
inquire about a phenomenon of real time video from a slightly different angle.
In Lazzarato's opinion, when applied to real-time technology such as, for instance,
television  and  video  art,  Bergsonian  theory  opposes  alternative  theoretical  views  in
philosophy,  according  to  which  the  temporality  of  the  latter  spatializes  time,  and  thus,
artificially  constructs  a  fourth  dimension  of  space  (Lazzarato  2007).  In  particular,  the
argument, closely related to this, is pursued by Paul Virilio who stresses that the appearance
of cinema in the end of the 19th century has already implied a different mode of perception and
initiated a general transformation in “shared temporal rhythms of life” (James 2008: 191). For
Virilio, therefore, video, similarly to cinema and television, modifies “the light of day” and
brings a kind of uncertainty without any relation to real time whatsoever (Virilio 1991: 14). In
video, time becomes not only artificially instantaneous and averts delays and intervals, but it
also turns into something that imposes new modes of thought and cognition (Lazzarato 2007).
In my opinion, it is possible to conclude that for Virilio, the indexical connection of analog
video with the world is lost in its unstable “images whose sole duration is that of retinal
persistence”  (Virilio  1991:  26).  By  and  large,  the  loss  of  spatial  and  material  reference
advocated by Virilio opposes Bergsonian viewpoint, according to which “the reality of things”
is not “constructed or reconstructed, but touched, penetrated, lived” (Bergson 1911: 75). For
Bergson, time unfolds only in duration, so to speak, in the real time of movement, because it
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acts and produces difference. For this reason, Bergson thinks of time as a carrier of creative
forces, a bearer of choice, and an indivisible change of live. 
As I attempted to show, both notions of the analog and the digital entail a range of
contradictive  questions  that  remain  baffling  for  scholars  inquiring  about  the  difference
between these two modes of expression in art and technology. If projected on video art, the
analog could be distinguished from the digital  by means of indexical connections that are
preserved in analog video and severed in digital. However, since I have left aside a number of
theories that deal with the analog-digital debates from various angles, I would like to stress
that  the  latter  distinction  is  only  one  of  the  possible,  yet  the  most  common  among  the
researches  in  this  field40.  Moreover,  as  I  have  described,  the  line  of  thinking  based  on
indexicality  does  not  fully  extricate  the  digital-analog  question  in  video  because  of  the
ambiguous 'in-betweenness' of the latter. For this reason, as I have proposed, Deleuze's idea to
distinguish between the analog and the digital based on their capacity to produce sensations
seems  to  be  more  appealing,  since  it  takes  into  account  a  notion  of  modulation  as  a
constructive  force,  and  in  doing  so,  helps  to  establish  the  analogy  between  the  creative
potential of analog video in arts and Bergsonian idea of duration as living force. On the other
hand though, I have also demonstrated that such a point of view is only one of many, and
there might exist alternative ideas regarding the 'creative' potential of video art. Nonetheless, I
remain in agreement with Bergson and Deleuze and therefore, while continuing my endeavour
into the process of experimental modeling, would like to turn to the probable potentialities of
video to surpass habitual perception and extend the range of memory actualisation.
4.6. Altering Perception: Synthesis and Processing
In the frame of last aspects of video in connection to Bergson's idea of memory, which, I
think, can contribute the research topic and expand the argument that I have been developing
so far, I want to touch upon the notion of habit. More specifically, I intend to briefly discuss
40 Alternatively, there exist opinions which question the disappearance of indexical relations in the digital. 
Thus, following philosopher Manuel De Landa and physicist David Bohm in their assumptions that the  
distinction between organic life and nonorganic matter is arbitrary and 'inert' matter, similarly to animated, 
can exhibit self-organising behaviour and obtain experience, Laura U. Marks develops the argument that 
digital media “are constituted by material processes no less than photography, film, and analog video are” 
(Marks 1999: 67)
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video synthesis and video processing with regard to their ability to expand our perception of
'reality' and soften the bounds of habit. My further hypothesis is that video art can expose the
habitual nature of our perception and point in the direction of how to loose these restrains and
surpass the boundaries of the repeated day-to-day mode of living. In addition, I consider this
sub-chapter to be the attempt to find a more applied outcome of my paper, and a step closer to
the assumption that video art, if analysed from Bergsonian perspective, can potentially lower
the perceptual threshold, and inversely, can therefore create more possibilities for memory to
be actualised in the present. 
According  to  Bergson,  habit  exists  in  the  body.  He  explains  it  by  means  of
evolutionary adaptation which is needed to condition the survival of life. At the same time, he
also criticises habit for its automatism and discontinuity. First, rather than reflecting the nature
as it  is,  habit creates a kind of habitual representation of the world (Ansell  Pearson  et al
2002). Second, it results in the habitual confusion of time with space (Ansell Pearson 2007).
Finally,  habitual  perception  neglects  duration  and  describes  the  complex  process  of
actualisation of memory as a single utilized movement (Bergson 1911). 
Analog video as a medium of video art, it was suggested, is made of modulation of
signal. By the same token, these signals are made of analog waveforms which, in turn, exist in
the universe as light energy. For this reason, I propose, the medium of analog video does not
create the representation of the world.  Instead, the representation is created simultaneously
with the operation of our mind which tries to translate between movements and decipher what
is 'sees' on the video screen. A video camera in this regard can detect a kind of phenomena
which human mind cannot recognize and discern those waveforms from the universe which
we cannot perceive. Further, it was also stressed that video is a temporal medium, it does not
exist  in space but 'happens'  in time akin to duration. Finally, I argue,  video as an artistic
device does not  neglect  duration but,  in  contrast,  appreciates it  trying to  surpass habitual
perception. 
Developing Bergson's concept of habit, Deleuze writes that the mode of being built on
habit hiders the possibility “to go beyond the human condition” and prevents the experience
of “durations which are inferior or superior to our own” (Deleuze 1991: 28). For instance, a
limited  bandwidth  of  our  eyes  not  only  prevents  us  from  being  overwhelmed  with  the
exhaustively vibrant spectrum of light, but also filters matter allowing us to see only 'visible'
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images. In turn, our mind habitually reconstructs the movement by means of  isolating the
fragments  of  reality,  erasing  all  subtle  differences  between  them and  creating  a  kind  of
'simplified'  movement. Video art in this regard tries to push the boundaries of reality and
suggests that something might exist beyond. At this point, I think, it is relevant to evoke the
idea that video art is closer to intuition which, for Bergson, is “a fully developed method” that
“already presupposes duration”, as well as the possibility of knowledge of life as an open and
dynamic system (Deleuze 1991: 13). It can be suggested therefore that, like intuition, video
slightly opens the access to pure memory and pure perception, and if it is combined with the
mind which is “a storehouse of motor habits but not of memories” in the first place, it can also
extend the human present (Bergson  1975: 35).  “The human condition is  the maximum of
duration concentrated in the present, but there is no co-exclusivity to being – that is, there is
not only the present” (Deleuze  2007 [1960]: 79).  With this in mind, I want to  turn to the
medium of video and inspect its capacities to expand the present. In my opinion, the most
evident perceptual alteration that video art brings is achieved via the technique of feedback,
video processing and video synthesis. 
Video feedback is the trademark of early video art. Together with the real-time mode
of transmission, it constitutes the main distinctive features of video as an artistic medium.
More specifically, video feedback is generated when a video camera and a monitor connected
to the camera are directed at each other thereby creating a so called 'closed circuit'. Such an
arrangement  produces  a  technical  effect  in  which  the  inputted  and outputted  information
interact with each other. In general terms, video feedback is an equivalent of audio feedback
to the extent that both are based on the same mechanism of the amplification of the signal. In
the process of the information exchange, some parts of the output signal are sent back to the
input and otherwise, and this, in turn, constantly amplifies the signal. For video feedback to
be  created,  it  does  not  require  such  techniques  of  manipulation  with  an  image  as  video
processing  or  synthesis,  yet  they  can  be  creatively  combined  in  order  to  produce  more
complicated alterations. Additionally, it is also possible to alter feedback signal by rotating the
camera, zooming, manipulating with focus, brightness, or contrast of the image. 
The most immediate effect of video feedback is irrational and unbalanced behaviour of
video signal expressed in its apparent self-reflexivity and instantaneous echoing. The close
analysis  with  respect  to  Bergson's  idea  of  simultaneous  co-existence  of  the  past  and the
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present, however,  helps to look at the former as an analogy of a single moment of life in
which virtual memory that exists in the past merges with actual perception that exists in the
present. More precisely, video feedback stands first, for the process of leaping “into the being
in itself of the past” (Deleuze 1991: 56), second, for discernment of a proper memory-image
from the past, and third, signifies the embodiment of the latter in the present perception.  
While the aesthetic effect of video feedback can be described by means of a kind of
surrealistic  art,  the  creativity  of  unconsciousness,  the  effect  of  feedback  with  respect  to
conventional day-to-day experience results in the disintegration of 'reality' and the possibility
to experience everything that lies beyond. In video art, the technology of feedback was widely
used by almost every video artist, due to its applicability for nearly every sub-genre of video
art (apart from, probably, more politicised documentary video art which tends to stick closer
to  'reality').  In  this  context,  Woody and Steina  Vasulka  were  one  of  the  most  passionate
'researchers' of feedback and together or individually composed an extensive number of video
works  based  on  the  effect  of  'closed  circuit'.  I  have  already  referred  to  Steina  Vasulka's
“Distant Activities” – an electronic video abstraction created from a processed video feedback
(ill. 2) and “Orbital Obsessions” –  a closed-circuit of video transmission (ill. 7). Since I have
briefly discussed these two videos with respect to non-representational features and reflexivity
of video, I want to go back and look at them from the perspective of a feedback technology.
Both  videos  invite  into  a  bizarre  sensual  adventure  akin  to  immersion  into  a  cosmic
surroundings. At the same time, in “Distant Activities”, from video signal Steina shapes a
formless radiating body which has nothing in common with something that we might know or
experience in everyday practice. Rather than evoking the habitual  representation and then
changing  it,  this  artwork  composes  completely  new experience  that  goes  beyond human.
Video  feedback  sculpted  into  a  kind  of  disproportional  self-transforming  organism  also
generates a disturbing low sound that contributes to uncanny and almost otherworldly effect
of the video work. “Orbital Obsessions”, in contrast, is created from the environment that is
more familiar to the eye – Steina's studio and geometrical elements assembled in a segment of
machine.  However,  the effect  of further segmentation,  rotation and overlapping of images
induces the dissolution of 'reality',  and in doing so, severs habitual perception of the image.
Additional distortion is created by the mirrored camera that  multiplies the video image and
endlessly replicates it. Like in “Distant Activities”, the feedback in “Orbital Obsessions” also
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produces the audible effect that in turn emphasises the distortion of 'reality' and disassociation
of the familiar image into the delusional repeated video sequences.
As it is seen from Steina's videos, the effect of video feedback can significantly be
multiplied by video processing (also image processing).  The latter  is  the part  of  a  signal
processing related to the manipulations applied to video signals in which one video is used as
an input and another comes as an output41.  In video art,  video processing emerged as an
experimental movement among those artists who were not afraid to expand their creativity
with the help of technology, and later evolved into a separate genre of video – the art of image
processing. On one hand, video processing in art encompasses a broad variety of alterations of
optically  recorded  video:  colourising,  keying,  switching,  fading,  sequencing,  delaying,
looping and other similar manipulations.  On the other, it  also includes more sophisticated
analog computer processing (mostly  without videotape recorder), cameraless synthesis, and
video modifications by means of raw electronics. Today, most of these operations can be done
with the help of a digital computer and a specially installed software, or achieved through the
hybrid instruments mediated by the digital computer. Because of the digital interference, the
output  of such a computer-involved processing will  result  in the digital  video. Within the
framework of early video art, in contrast, video processing was possible only by means of the
analog hardware or analog computers which dealt with the alteration of continuous waveform
without breaking it into discrete time signals. 
Video synthesizer, a “tip of the iceberg” of electronic technology and video arts (Beck
1976:  184),  is  the  most  advance  level  of  the  manipulation  with  video.  Strictly  speaking,
synthesis is not a processing as such, because, in its purest form, a video input is absent, and a
waveform  is  produced  by  the  hardware.  However,  in  the  70s,  many  artists  used  mixed
techniques  to  create  the  sophisticated  video  imaging,  and for  this  reason,  the  process  of
synthesising of video encompasses both video processing and synthesis. These two processes
41 In commercial application, video processing refers to a broad variety of methods – from the recovery of 
video, its correction, restoration, enhancement, to video compression and final storage. In the narrow 
interpretation, even a simple operation of the filtering of video signals is already assumed to be a video 
processing. The broader definition however, expands the understanding of the processing chain beyond the 
boarders of the medium. Under this framework, the output is seen as a final decision to be made based on the 
results of the processed video (for instance, in medicine, hard sciences, computational science, etc). For this 
reason, video processing has a diversity of applications and significantly overlaps with such traditionally 
separated fields of studies as communication, computer vision, machine learning, optimisation, etc. In this 
chapter, video processing is analysed in its direct connection with the development of video art and 
considered as an important step in the artistic exploration of video as a medium. 
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allow video to be output either  in real-time when the artist  interact with video producing
direct effects, or through the programmable distance mode when the presence of the artist
does not affect the output of video. In my opinion, these two techniques of manipulation of
video – video processing and video synthesis – disrupt the stability of our perception and, by
the same token, expand the possibilities for memory to be actualised. 
Habitual actions give stable perception, and inversely, they also imply a certain fixed
limit for the actualisation of memory in the present.  According to Bergson, there exists a
mutual support between a  habit-memory which is  tied to sensori-motor mechanisms in the
body and a true memory of the past which lays the ground for perception to happen in the
present.  In  fact, as I  have explicated above, these two types  of memory are substantially
inseparable because one conditions the existence of another and otherwise: a memory of the
past gives “the direction suggested by the lessons of experience” to a habit-memory, and a
habit-memory makes the recollections reappear in the present moment by actualising them in
the present perception (Bergson 1911: 132). Likewise, since the act of recollection moves
from the past into the present – from the virtual (memory) into the actual (perception), both
memory and perception directly determine the existence of each other. On one hand, memory
starts from pure memory which further progresses into conscious memory and finally obtains
the  embodiment into the  present  perception.  On the other,  I  propose,  a  perception of the
present  moment  mediated  sensually  via  the  body  determines  the  scope  of  all  future
recollections that can possibly take place. For this reason, I suggest, the process of lowering
or expanding the threshold of perception in the present can influence memory which in the
process of next recollection will again proceed from the past and be embodied in the present. 
A video “Einstein” (1968, USA) made by Eric Siegel, one of the first developers of
early image-processors and synthesisers,  eloquently demonstrates the perceptual  confusion
and also provokes a new layer of memory to be preserved in the past (ill. 8). In this artwork,
Siegel used colouriser in order to alter a photograph of Albert Einstein and fuse it to the piece
of music of Rimsky-Korsakov. Not only does the effect of the video amend our habitual
representation of these two geniuses vividly colourising Einstein's portrait in real time and
merging it with the tunes of Rimsky-Korsakov but also evokes the state of delirium which
fascinated both Deleuze and Bergson. Furthermore, “Einstein” shows how our senses (sight
and  hearing)  literally  blend  with  each  other  on  one  hand,  and  demonstrates  the  mutual
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relationship of video image and music, on the other. From this perspective, the video of Siegel
tries  to  surpass  habit  in  two  ways.  First,  it  influents  the  habitual  way  of  thinking  and
destabilises  the  process  of  repetitive  recognition  of  external  signals  we  receive  from the
surroundings. By any means, now, with the proliferation of digital technologies, this kind of
experience became a mundane practice, because it can be easily achieved with the help of
every portable computer or even mobile phone. At the same time, in the 1960 –1970s, this
sort of 'visual hallucination' was rather unusual  in many aspects. Since this kind of video
manipulations  were  mostly  done  in  real  time,  it  came  as  a  radical  novelty  that  can  be
performed only on special occasions (as for instance, art performance). From this angle, early
video art  can be considered as an agent of perceptual disruption which,  after cinema and
television, created the firm ground for digital technologies to intervene smoothly in our daily
lives.  My latter  argument,  however,  opens new political  debates on video which I do not
intend to develop in this work. At this point, it is suffice to stress that I share an affirmative
view on technological development (including, of course, video as technology) as something
that can expand our existence, and do not support more utilitarian and kind of fatalistic views
according to which technology either exists as a problem-solving tool or as a mode of tyranny
gradually enslaving humanity.  
Second, Siegel's work also widens the spectrum of recollections that can happen in the
next moment of the present. After watching the video which provokes a kind of perceptual
confusion, we obtain a new experience in which this sort of perceptual dissociation of reality
becomes possible: the experience was visual and audible, and therefore, it can be stored in the
past and repeated in the next moment of the present. As a result, it is possible to assume that
the  amount  of  the past  stored  in  conscious  memory determines  the  amount of  the  active
recognition in the act of present perception. By the same token, these two elements bring
more possibilities for memory to be actualised. 
As I attempted to point, video art therefore can loose the restrains of habit, and to
some extent,  even  outstep  the  threshold  of  perception  thereby  laying  the  ground  for  the
appreciation of duration, memory and intuition. In its  large diversity of the forms of video
processing and synthesis, it can also open the gates leading to the path that extends the human
condition and gives  the access  to  durations  superior  to  our  own.  Finally,  video art  as  an
imaginative, provoking and intelligent art form can bring us closer to the wisdom of life. After
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all,  as  Bergson put  it,  to  philosophise  “is  to  invert  the  habitual  direction of  the  work of
thought”, (Bergson 1912: 69–70). 
4.7. Body and Real-Time Video
As I have stated in the introduction, in my opinion, video becomes an artwork only by means
of a kind of creative  synthesis between the artist and the video medium. For this reason, I
consider the  role of the former to be fundamental for the process of making artistic videos,
and therefore, want to extend the modeling that I have done above with respect to a video
camera onto the body of an artist. In this regard, in my opinion, the tandem of a camera and
an artist endows video with an additional expressivity that moves beyond the current moment
towards the arrival of a special novelty – a new present manifested both in our body and in
our memory. Furthermore, in doing so, I presume that Bergsonian concept of memory that
was initially  meant  to  understand human memory can equally be expanded onto creative
synergy that arises from the cooperation of the artist and the medium of video. Such an artistic
expressivity comes as a result  of a kind of 'inseparability' of video art and the artist,  and
eventually helps to inquire into the question of what video art is. In addition, I also attempt to
compare the medium of video with its openness to the outside world to the affective force of
memory with its  ability  to  act  on the  junction of  virtual  and actual.  Moreover,  since  the
question  of  where  recollections  are  preserved  remains  open  until  now,  through  such  a
comparison, I expect to inquire into this intriguing locus of memory.
Advancing into the  idea  of  “shared”  creativity  between the video medium and an
artist, I suggest that such a creativity arises on several layers. First, as it was already noted by
Spielmann, it emanates  between the artist and the camera in the process of making artistic
videos  (Spielmann  2004:  22).  Second,  as  I  was  trying  to  show  in  the  context  of  the
materialisation of video, a kind of creative exchange also appears between the medium of
video and the camera in which the energy of light is encoded into video signals. Finally, and
this is the most important point for the discussion in this paragraph, a creative transaction
emerges between the artist and the medium of video. In this context, it is also remarkable that
video  can  be  generated  in  real  time;  furthermore,  I  would  say,  this  way of  creating  and
performing video is one of the most significant features of video as an art medium. 
Touching upon the real-time mode of video, I have outlined that I agree with the views
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of Bergson and Deleuze on real time as an active and energetic force  of life. By the same
token, I have already demonstrated above that in art, video is always in movement, it consists
of translation, encoding, modulation, and in the process of its materialisation, video is not
fixated anywhere but spread in the body of the camera and scattered between the camera and
the  monitor.  Furthermore,  I  suggest,  video,  in  addition,  emanates  its  distinct  and  a  very
particular  presence  in  the  form  of  a  real-time  interaction  with  the  artist.  This  form  of
interaction is akin to the exchange of energy that takes place in the process of unfolding of
memory. Since it was also shown that, like video,  memory is always in constant movement
and in the process of self-transformation and difference, it  is possible to assume that both
video and memory share a certain degree of affective force that can be closely related based
on its creative capacity for action. 
For many artists,  video has its source in the live image. Thus, in the interview with
Raymond  Bellour,  Bill  Viola  comments  that  with  video,  everything  is  connected,  and
describes the medium of video as “a living,  dynamic system, an energy field” (Raymond
1985: 100). “When I first saw video feedback, I knew I had seen the cave fire. It had nothing
to do with anything, just a perpetuation of some kind of energy”, reflects Woody Vasulka in
the report done by Johanna Gill for The Rockefeller Foundation (Gill 1976: 46). In fact, the
whole  process  of  making art  videos  differs  from other  modes of  artistic  creation:  one  is
working with the image, and not creating the image, because, as Viola puts, it is the camera
who creates the image, and “it's synchronized with your experience at the moment you're
there” (Raymond 1985: 100). Indeed, this approach towards making video art implies that
video was considered by the early video artists as an 'intelligent'  entity endowed with the
immediate capacity to epitomize its electromagnetic energy via its physical presence in real
time. 
In like manner, manifested in duration, memory, according to Bergson, is force. More
specifically,  it  comprises  energy  of  movement,  and  has  the  power  to  change  matter  via
contraction and relaxation. In turn, 'privileged images' or bodies in Bergson's terminology that
act and react upon each other and upon themselves also exhibit power by being able to receive
and  transmit  movements,  and  thus,  produce  sensations  –  the  feature  of  all  living  beings
(Lazzarato 2007). It was already mentioned that bodies occupy a central place in Bergsonian
theory  of  memory,  since  without  embodiment,  the  latter  only  doubles  perception.  More
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exactly, by embodiment Bergson also implies the paradoxical co-existence of memory with
the present:
[...] we may speak of  the body as an ever advancing boundary between the future and the past, as a
pointed end, which our past is continually driving forward into our future. Whereas my body, taken at a
single moment, is but a conductor interposed between the objects which influence it and those on which
it acts, it is, on the other hand, when replaced in the flux of time, always situated at the very point where
my past expires in a deed (Bergson 1911: 88). 
In other words, following Bergson, I want to suggest that in the frame of his theory,
the exchange of energy happens on different levels. First and the most important, energy is
released in the process of unfolding of memory (in duration), because memory is energy, more
precisely, the energy of difference. Second, the exchange of energy takes place between the
'bodies', when they receive movements produced by duration and translate them into action.
Finally, a great amount of energy is needed to bring the change into the current 'present',
namely,  to actualise  the past and substitute  the old present by the new. This is why, as I
stressed before, the process of memory actualisation requires the 'fifth element' – “a kind of
displacement by which the past is embodied only in terms of a present that is different from
that which it has been” (Deleuze 1991: 71). And this completeness, Deleuze summarises, is
achieved in the arrival of a new present, the novelty of which we can feel both in our body
and in our consciousness.  
In the same way, the mechanism of video materialisation described above does not
include a very important element that makes video an art form – the artist. One may suggest,
however, that video has its own consciousness, technologically determined psyche. No doubt,
it can be extended in the fully developed argument42, yet in video art, especially in its early
form, I argue, the intrusion of the artist is of critical importance. Without its maker, video
would remain merely a technological offspring and the medium of mass communication akin
to television. Yet, because of the artist who endows the medium with the 'fifth element' – a
kind of a new presence described by Deleuze –  video becomes animated with life, and thus
blossoms into video art. Now, if we include the artist into the scheme proposed above (see the
Fig. 3), it will look as follows:
42 For instance, the theories of artificial intelligence seek to find the locus of consciousness in machines and 
define the mechanisms by which the latter can be synthesised; some of the sub-movements within 
transhumanism suggest the point of technological singularity and propose the fusion of man into machine.
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Fig. 4: The New Presence: Synergy of Video and Artist
In this context, the intrusion of the artist or, better put, his unutterable contribution and
the  dynamism  of  shared  creativity  which  results  from such  a  contribution  constitute  the
ingenious force of creation of the work of art, explaining its mysterious power and perplexing
sensual appeal. I should also comment that this idea, to some extent, deflects from the quoted
above views on video medium as an independent modality of being. Although, of course,
there is obviously much to agree with Viola, both Vasulka, Paik and others that video exists on
its own and manifests a dynamic energy of life, I am taking slightly different, though not
necessarily  incompatible  path.  In  my  opinion,  in  video  indeed  everything  is  connected,
however, this connection extends farther than the chain of recording (or synthesis), alteration
and playback, and involves the artist and the viewer, to say the least43. Moreover, I would say
that video is precisely something that could be thought by means of Bergsonian open systems
– the vibrating, constantly changing energy of life able to transform itself in every instance. In
this regard, the presence of the artist and the viewer, and the mutual exchange of creative
energy that takes place between them and the medium of video constitutes new becoming that
unfolds in the process of real-time performance:
Situated between the matter which influences it and that on which it has influence, my body is a centre
of action, the place where the impressions received choose intelligently the path they will follow to
transform themselves into movements accomplished. Thus it indeed represents the actual state of my
43 On the second thought, in perception of video art, similarly to all forms of art, everything makes difference: 
place, time, environment, even mood of the artists and viewers can alter the sensual rapport with the artwork. 
At the same time, because I am more interested in the process of creation of video works, I leave the right to 
withhold the analysis of these elements together with the viewer for the future study. 
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becoming, that part of my duration which is in process of growth (Bergson 1911: 178).
In this sense, the last artwork I want to refer to in order to provide a better illustration
for my ideas is the video work “Three Transitions” (1973, USA) made by Peter Campus (ill.
9). The video which consists of three short pieces shows the transformation of three different
images of the artist in real time. To some extent, this work can be approached as an electronic
self-portrait  of  the  artist:  by  monotonously  destroying  the  image  of  the  self,  Campus
successively employs such video techniques as simultaneous recording and playback with the
help of several cameras and chroma-key effects. In every next piece of this video, artist's body
is either torn apart, erased layer by layer or burned on the screen. At the same time, in the
process of such an electronic destruction, a new image materialises from the previously ruined
one. On one hand, it can be said that these videos imply a kind of electronic resurrection and a
sort  of  non-human  endurance  referring  to  the  transformative  nature  of  video  and  the
exchangeability of the self images which the artist  attempted to construct. On the other, I
would  argue  that  these  works  explicitly  point  at  the  creative  exchange  that  takes  place
between the artist and the medium of video. Thus, describing his approach towards video to
Johanna Gill, Campus explains that he is primarily interested in the opposition of human and
a camera, a human world and an electronic world, and in the transformation of energy that
takes place between these two terrains: 
[…] I'm very consciously working with transformations of energy . . . . You think of the video process:
light is focused by the lens in the camera, which is photon energy, hits the vidicon tube and is translated
into  electrical  energy,  comes  out  on  the  monitor  as  electrons,  the  stream  of  electrons  hits  that
phosphorous stuff and becomes light energy, photons again, is focused by the eye, hits the retina and
becomes neuron energy. The relationship between all that interests me (Gill 1976: 53).
In  order  to  expand my  line  of  thinking  and  find  the  response  to  the  question  of
memory storage, I would like to elaborate on relational aspect of video art as compared to the
active sensual bodies in Bergsonian quote above. Thus, Bergson makes a specific distinction
between the subjective and the objective. What we call objectivity for him is the “actual and
not merely virtual perception of subdivisions in what is undivided” (Bergson 1910: 84). In
contrast, subjectivity is the indivisible process, the operation of subdivision and the movement
of consciousness. In fact, Bergson stresses that since the mind pays more attention to its own
acts than to “the material on which it works”, we tend to think that we know subjective much
better than objective (Ibid.: 85). Hence Bergson's concern with traditional scientific methods
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which  in  his  view  rather  draw  our  attention  to  the  material  than  to  the  temporality  of
consciousness. 
This concept though informative and profound needs an additional explanation which
I  borrow  from  Deleuze.  For  Deleuze,  he  interprets  Bergsonian  distinction  between  the
subjective and the objective in the following way. First,  he develops the idea that by the
objective Bergson means “that which has no virtuality” and suggests that in the objective,
“everything is actual” (Deleuze 1991: 41). By extension, the subjective, following Deleuze, is
something that is always virtual and exists in the form of duration. Second, because of the
actuality of the objective, Deleuze calls the latter “a numerical multiplicity” and concludes
that in the objective, there are “no differences other than those in degree” (Ibid.: 43). In turn,
he continues, the subjective is “a nonnumerical multiplicity”, it is no longer spatial but purely
temporal: it “moves from the virtual to its actualization, it actualizes itself by creating lines of
differentiation that correspond to its differences in kind” (Ibid.). 
In turn, Deleuze's interpretation points in direction of video art as something that could
exist only in relation. First, as I stressed, video is a temporal form of art, it unfolds in time
akin to memory in the theory of Bergson. Second, video is virtual to the extent that it  is
always yet to come: similarly to duration as memory, video does not have the present, because
the present immediately becomes the past in every next moment. This is why, I think, video
art, especially in the form of real-time performance, is relational and, appropriating Bergson's
terminology, purely subjective. By the same token, a third type of 'shared' creativity between
the medium of video and the artist proposed earlier is based on nonnumerical multiplicity: it
arises in time from the interaction of the artist and the medium, and in so doing, augments
creativity actualising virtual potentialities of art.  
In  a  like manner,  in  contrast  to  objective matter  which  has  an existence  in  itself,
memory in Bergson is subjective. Like video art, it can exist only in relation to matter and
itself. While its relation to matter is expressed by the process of contraction in which memory
actualises virtual possibilities of matter, the relation of memory to itself is expressed by its
ability to differentiate itself and change its nature. Because of such a subjective character,
memory akin to video, cannot be stored somewhere. More precisely, it is preserved only in
itself and unfolds in duration, in relation to itself and to matter:
Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, [...] we become conscious of an act  sui generis by
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which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general,
then in a certain region of the past — a work of adjustment, something like the focussing of a camera.
But our recollection still  remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it  by adopting the
appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; from the virtual state it
passes into the actual;  [...]  it  tends to imitate perception. But it  remains attached to the past  by its
deepest roots, and if, when once realized, it did not retain something of its original virtuality, if, being a
present state, it were not also something which stands out distinct from the present, we should never
know it for a memory (Bergson 1911: 171).
Deleuze comments that this passage from Bergson's Matter and Memory not only fully
summarises his theory but also explains the nature of memory, and the locus of recollection.
Thus, Deleuze writes that the past in Bergson exists not in ourselves, and by extension, not in
our present, but it is “like an ontological element, a past that is eternal and for all time, the
condition of the “passage” of every particular present” (Deleuze 1991: 56). More precisely,
Bergsonian past for Deleuze endures in general, and in the process of recollection we literally
“leap into being, into being-in-itself: into the being in itself of the past” (Ibid.: 57). Hence the
explanation of memory as the ontological leap into the past that makes possible recollection in
the form of a psychological existence. This is why, both Deleuze and Bergson highlight, we
tend to think in terms of the present and inclined to believe that current present becomes past
only when it is replaced by another 'present'. However, both refute this idea and explain that
the past exists simultaneously with the present. “The past does not follow the present, but on
the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it would not pass. In
other words, each present goes back to itself as past” (Ibid.: 59). In this passage, Deleuze
demonstrates  that  for  the  present  to  become  it  needs  the  past  with  which  it  can  be
synchronous. In turn, such a 'present-past'  is impossible without the “past in general”– the
ontological past in which memory is conserved. Following Deleuze, the present therefore is
psychological  and the  past,  in  contrast,  purely ontological.  This  is  why,  as  it  was  stated
previously, memory exists only in itself and in the process of materialisation, manifests itself
in the present moment through embodied perception. 
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Conclusion
In this paper, I attempted to construct an approximate model of memory based on the concept
of memory conceived by Henri Bergson on one hand, and to find the analogical connections
between this  model and the phenomenon of video art,  on the  other.  I  have  assumed that
memory in the theory of Bergson and video art share a number of closely related features that
can be approached by establishing a metaphorical connection between memory and video art. 
In the process of modeling, I have touched upon the problematic aspects of video art
such as its inseparability from technology and diversity of definitions, and have also outlined
a number of specific characteristics that define the video medium in art. In addition, I have
elucidated the problems that surround memory in the theory of Bergson, namely the absence
of memory's storage  and its  unfolding in  time,  the  reverse  direction of its  movement,  its
inseparability  from  perception,  and  finally,  simultaneous  existence  of  two  incompatible
notions – the past and the present. However, rather than aiming to resolve these problematic
aspects, I wanted to engender arguments, initiate new debates on video as a medium of art, as
well as to clarify the mechanism of memory in the theory of Bergson. In this connection, and
with regard to the goals that I have outlined in the beginning of this paper, I have come to the
following valuable for me conclusions. 
First, via the methodological approach based on metaphorical modeling, I was able not
only to come closer to the understanding of the concept of memory in the theory of Bergson
and the notion of video art, but also to model these two phenomena with respect to each other.
Thus, via  the metaphorical  connections that  I  have attempted to establish on the different
levels, I have discerned common characteristics of video and memory such as transformative
plasticity, continuous movement, active 'intelligent' recognition, special 'liveness' reflected in
the vibrating energy of both memory and video, and finally, sensual affective force. Likewise,
by juxtaposing these two phenomena, I have concluded that real-time video and memory in
Bergson's theory cannot be preserved somewhere else but only in itself in the form of duration
or temporality. In this regard, it can be said that there is more in virtuality of memory than in
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the present embodiment, and by the same token, more in the potentiality of video than in the
actual image. 
Second, in my attempt to combine video art and memory in the theory of Bergson, I
was able  to  sketch the  mechanisms of  how memory and video art  work.  The method of
metaphorical modeling, in turn, helped me to project these two mechanisms on each other and
thus, to look at them in more detail. As a result of such a projection, I have come to my own
definition of video art as a phenomenon in which the medium of video enters in the reciprocal
exchange with the artist,  eventually culminating in the synthesis of creativity and novelty.
This conclusion, however lucid, has derived from my discovery that memory, when embodied
in duration and having a capacity for action, can stand for such an analogy of the synthesis
between the artist and the medium of video. In my assumption, this synthesis is something
that makes video an artistic medium. Moreover, I have also found that video as an art form is
able to loose the restrains of habits and to mediate the 'reality' that lies beyond our perceptual
threshold and the spectrum of our conscious memory. In this context, I have apprehended
video art as an affirmative phenomenon able to expand the horizons of our human existence. 
Finally,  in  the  process  of  drawing the  analogy  between  video art  and  memory in
Bergson, I had an opportunity to check if memory in his theory can equally be compared to
the analog and digital forms of video art. In this regard, although, in my opinion, the model of
memory that I have attempted to construct significantly helps to understand the nature of early
analog video art, it poses a number of questions with respect to digital video art and so-called
hybrid video art  that encompasses both analog and digital  media.  Thus,  the operation by
which the mind discerns movements reminds me of the processes of discretisation that take
place in the digital. Similarly to the mind, digital signal is subjected to approximation and
selection (sampling and quantisation) which, by the same token, take place when the mind,
according to Bergson, translates between movements. Likewise, habit can also be understood
as a kind of automatic recognition in the digital, however, this aspect has remained obscure. 
In  addition,  I  could  not  come  to  the  firm  conclusion  whether  digital  signal  is
indivisible like analog signal and memory in Bergson, and whether it exists as a difference in
degree or in kind. By the same token, I was not able to agree upon if digital art can bear
indexical connection with 'reality' and to what extent we can refer to 'reality' with respect to
digital art. Along with the latter aspect, the question of whether digital video art unfolds only
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in space or it also progresses in time remained likewise open. On one hand, a matrix of digital
image is strongly associated with spatiality, on the other though, digital video manifests its
presence in time when it is performed by artists. By extension, space-time discussion triggers
such issues as contraction, relaxation, synthesis, subjectivity, non-numerical  multiplicity and
transformability of digital video. For this reason, the following question arises: to what extent,
then, the latter can be conceptualised as memory or as matter in Bergson. 
By and large, however, all these open questions imply that the similar research which I
have attempted to make in connection to analog video art can be done with respect to digital
video art, and the model of memory that I have built can be projected on the latter with proper
adjustments. In this context, my sketch can be used in order to find the differences between
memory in Bergsonian theory and digital video art. Overall, the above mentioned findings can
be summarised in the following comparative table:
 Table: Memory, Matter, Video Art
Memory/ Duration Matter Video Art/ Analog Video Art/ Digital
continuous discontinuous continuous discontinuous
unfolds in time unfolds in space unfolds in time unfolds in space/in time
indivisible divisible indivisible divisible/indivisible
virtual actual potential/actual potential/actual
simple complex simple complex
exists in contraction exists in relaxation exists in contraction exists in 
contraction/relaxation
affective inert affective affective
heterogeneous homogeneous heterogeneous homogeneous
subjective objective subjective objective/subjective
nonnumerical
multiplicity
numerical
multiplicity
nonnumerical
multiplicity
numerical/nonnumerical
multiplicity
difference in kind difference in degree difference in kind difference in kind/degree
synthesis un-synthesized form synthesis synthesis/
un-synthesized form
intelligent
recognition
automatic
recognition
intelligent recognition intelligent/automatic
recognition
transformative static transformative transformative/static
difference repetition difference/repetition difference/repetition
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In the table, I have summarised the features of memory, matter and video art (both digital and
analog) which I have managed to discern in the process of writing this paper. As a result of
my analysis, I came to the conclusion that whereas memory and analog video are notions with
continuous, simple and heterogeneous modes of expression, matter and digital video operate
on the discontinuous, complex and homogeneous modes. With respect to digital, 'complex'
means that within one coded sequence of just two numbers there may exist a large variety of
combinations. In addition, as it is reflected in the table, digital video also differs from matter
and  shares  similar  features  with  memory  and  analog  video.  In  particular,  based  on  my
conclusion,  all  three notions are affective (or interactive), and  matter, in contrast,  is inert.
However, with respect to Bergson's theory, this aspect nonetheless requires more thorough
analysis if it is to be applied to study digital video art. Finally, I have also discovered that
memory and both forms of video carry some differences, which, I think, could initiate a few
interesting discussions of this kind. Thus, whereas memory in Bergson is a virtual substance
that operates via difference, I came to the conclusion that both analog and digital forms of
video combine in themselves virtual and actual presence, as well as reciprocity of difference
and repetition. 
Lastly,  I  would  like  to  add  that  many  of  the  concepts  that  could  have  possibly
contributed my analysis were excluded because of the time-volume limit.  Thus, I did not
elaborate on such related to memory components of Bergsonian theory as creativity and free
will and almost bypassed the notion of time. Moreover, I think, the concepts of intuition and
duration  deserve  a  way  more  attention  that  I  payed in  this  paper.  Likewise,  I  left  aside
Deleuze's ideas of material and spiritual synthesis which, to some extent,  could have also
expanded the analysis of memory as analog video art and otherwise. Furthermore, the aspect
of real-time technology could have been elucidated with higher precision. In addition, as I
stated in the paper, I deliberately excluded the viewer from the analysis and concentrated on
the role of the artist in the process of creation of video works. At the same time, I consider all
these exclusions as a sign of new academical challenges that wait for me around the corner. 
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Videokunsti modelleerimine. Bergsonist lähtuv käsitlus 
Eestikeelne kokkuvõte
Käesolevas  töös  kasutan  metafoorset  modelleerimist  meetodina,  mis  võimaldab  kasutada
mälu mudelit videokunsti uurimisel. Täpsemalt loon seose Henri Bergsoni mälukäsitluse ja
varase, 1960ndatest 1980ndate lõpuni piiritletava analoogvideot kasutava videokunsti vahel.
Mõlemas kontseptsioonid – nii mälu Bergsonil kui videokunst – on jätnud rohkelt vastamata
küsimusi, esitades seetõttu uurijatele mitmeid väljakutseid. Samas pakuvad nendevahelised
seosed peaaegu läbiuurimata pinnase tulevasteks eksperimentideks. 
Bergsoni  järgi  eksisteerib mälu ajas lahtirulluva kestvusena,  mineviku pikendusena
olevikku.  Analoogvideo,  omakorda,  omab  ambivalentset  positsiooni  kunsti  ja  tehnoloogia
vahel. Sellel on mitmeid erilisi tunnuseid, mis kordistuvad video kunstilise kasutuse käigus.
Oma uurimuses lähtun oletusest, et Bergsoni mälukontsptsioon ja analoogvideokunst jagavad
mitmeid ühiseid tunnuseid, mis pakuvad lähtekoha, modelleerimaks mälu videokunstina ja
vastupidi – videokunsti mäluna.
Käesolevas töös ei püüa ma seega üksnes mõista kahte omapärast nähtust – mälu nagu
see on Bergsoni poolt  kontseptualiseeritud ja videokunsti – ning osutada nende toimimise
mehhanismidele,  vaid leida selle kaudu ka vastust  küsimusele,  mis teeb videost  kunstilise
meediumi.  Lisaks  püüan  ka  siseneda  laiemasse  digitaalse  ja  analoogmeedia  konteksti,
uurimaks  visandlikult,  kas  selline,  Bergsonist  lähtuv  mälukäsitlus  on  rakendatav  ka
digitaalsele videole.
Seega  ei  ole  mu  ambitsiooniks  luua  uut  mälu-kontseptsiooni  või  väita,  et
traditsioonilised mälukäsitlused oleksid ebaadekvaatsed.  Samuti  ei  soovi  ma konstrueerida
video  kui  kunstimeediumi  universaalset  mudelit.  Ennekõike  soovin  vaadelda  mälu  ja
videokunsti  teistsugusest,  minu  arvates  eksperimentaalsemast  perspektiivst  ning  pakkuda
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ligilähedase  mudeli,  mis  võimaldaks leida nendele uusi  mõtestamise viise.  Minu peamine
eesmärk olekski see, et käesoleva uurimuse tulemused võimaldaksid kunstnikel ja uurijatel
näha oma uurimisala uuel, laiahaardelisemal viisil ja nad leiaksid minu katses modelleerida
kahte väga erinevat nähtust uue metodoloogilise tööriista
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Appendices
ill. 1: Nam June Paik “9/23/69: Experiment with David Atwood”, 1969, USA, 80 min., colour
ill. 2: Steina Vasulka “Distant Activities”, 1972, USA, 6 min., colour
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ill. 3: Dan Sandin “Triangle in Front of Square in Front of Circle in Front of Triangle”, 1973, 
USA, 3 min., b&w
Ill. 4: Stephen Beck and Warner Jepson “Illuminated Music”, 1972-1973, USA, 28 min., 
colour
ill. 5: Steina Vasulka “Violin Power”, 1978, USA, 10 min. 04 sec., b&w
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ill. 6: Woody Vasulka “The Matter”, 1974, USA, 4 min., colour
ill. 7: Steina Vasulka “Orbital Obsessions”, 1977, USA, 28 min., b&w
ill. 8: Eric Siegel “Einstein”, 1968, USA, 5 min. 22 sec., colour
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ill. 9: Peter Campus “Three Transitions”, 1973, USA, 4 min. 53 sec., colour
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